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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on political economy.
The first essay studies the effect of competition on media bias in the context of U.S. newspa-
pers in the period 1870-1910. We measure bias as the intensity with which different newspapers
cover scandals. We collected data on 121 scandals and 157 newspapers. We also collected data on
the partisanship, frequency of publication, and circulation of the newspapers in our sample, as
well as of the newspapers circulating in the same cities as those in our sample. Results indicate
that partisan newspapers cover scandals involving the opposition party’s politicians more in-
tensely and cover scandals involving their own party’s politicians more lightly. We find evidence
that competition decreases the degree of media bias. The point estimates suggest that compared
to a newspaper in a monopoly position, a newspaper facing two competitors will on average
exhibits less than 50% as much overall bias in coverage intensity.
The second essay shows how voters make choices even in single-party authoritarian elections
where the number of candidates equals the number of parliamentary seats. Cuban citizens signal
approval of, candidates within the framework of the regime. Voters support candidates who have
grassroots links and experience of local multi-candidate electoral contestation. Voters choose
based not on clientelist incentives but on the limited political information available to them,
namely, posted biographies and direct knowledge of local candidates, friends and neighbors, who
run in their communities. Voters have chosen, however, without rejecting the Cuban Communist
Party.
iii
The third essay studies the unintended effects of the 2003 electoral reform in Colombia. In a
context with fragmented and clientelistic parties and an electoral system that incentivizes intra-
party competition instead of party discipline, scholars such as Shugart and Carey (1995) recom-
mend the adoption of electoral reforms. A reform such as this was implemented in Colombia.
What was unexpected was that the reform would promote a significant increase in the number of
candidates running in each district. The effect of this was a lowering of the minimum threshold of
the vote share required to obtain a seat, thereby maintaining clientelism as a viable campaigning
strategy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three separate papers on different topics on political economy.
The first essay studies the effect of competition on media bias in the context of U.S. newspa-
pers in the period 1870-1910. We measure bias as the intensity with which different newspapers
cover scandals. Using automatic keyword-based searches, we collected data on 121 scandals and
157 newspapers. We also collected data on the partisanship, frequency of publication, and circu-
lation of the newspapers in our sample, as well as of the newspapers circulating in the same cities
or towns as those in our sample. Our results indicate that partisan newspapers cover scandals
involving the opposition party’s politicians more intensely and cover scandals involving their
own party’s politicians more lightly. More importantly, we find evidence that competition de-
creases the degree of media bias. The point estimates suggest that compared to a newspaper in
a monopoly position, a newspaper facing two competitors will on average exhibits less than 50%
as much overall bias in coverage intensity.
The second essay shows how voters make choices even in single-party authoritarian elections
where the number of candidates equals the number of parliamentary seats. Cuban citizens sig-
nal disinterest in, or approval of, candidates within the framework of the political regime. Voters
support candidates who have grassroots links and some experience of local multi-candidate elec-
toral contestation. Voters choose based not on clientelist incentives but on the limited political
information available to them, namely, posted biographies and direct knowledge of local candi-
dates, friends and neighbors, who run in their communities. No other source or information, or
level of education, helps voters distinguish between their choices. Voters have chosen, however,
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without rejecting the Cuban Communist Party, whose leaders voters sometimes endorse.
Finally, the third essay studies the unintended effects of the 2003 electoral reform in Colombia.
In a context with fragmented and clientelistic parties and an electoral system that incentivizes
intra-party competition instead of party discipline, scholars such as Shugart and Carey (1995) rec-
ommend the adoption of electoral reforms. A reform such as this was implemented in Colombia.
What was unexpected was that the reform would promote a significant increase in the number of
candidates running in each district. The effect of this was a lowering of the minimum threshold
of the vote share required to obtain a seat. I show how for every district magnitude the vote
share required to obtain a seat has decreased after the reform and argue how this decrease might
make clientelism an even more likely strategy than before (based on Hirano (2006)).
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2. NEWSPAPER MARKET STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR: PARTISAN COVERAGE
OF POLITICAL SCANDALS IN THE U.S. FROM 1870 TO 19101
How does media market structure affect what media outlets do? Does more competition lead
to more intensive and accurate reporting (as in Besley and Prat 2006, and Gentzkow and Shapiro
2008), more “soft news” rather than “hard news” (as in Zaller 1999), more product differentiation
and market segmentation (as in Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005), or something else?
In this paper, we focus on the effect of competition on partisan bias in coverage. We investi-
gate this issue in the context of U.S. newspapers around the turn of the 20th century, from 1870 to
1910. This time period is especially interesting for three reasons: (1) newspapers and magazines
were essentially the only mass media outlets, which means both that there was considerable vari-
ation in the media environment across geographic areas of the U.S., and that we can measure this
variation accurately; (2) most newspapers were highly partisan, especially during the early part
of our period of study; and (3) there was a noticeable trend towards independent newspapers
over the course of the period, and therefore temporal variation in media market structure that
we can exploit.
To measure bias, we focus on the agenda setting behavior of newspapers, that is, the degree
to which journalists and editors cover certain topics while ignoring others, in a way that favors a
political party or ideological position (e.g. Larcinese et al. 2011; Puglisi 2011; Puglisi and Snyder
2011).2 The agenda setting bias of newspapers can have large effects on voters (e.g. McCombs
1 Joint with James M. Snyder, Jr., and BK Song, Harvard University
2 Scholars have attempted to measure bias in several different ways, including analyzing the agenda setting behav-
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and Shaw 1972). In fact, by exploiting their agenda-setting power, actors on the supply side of
the media market can have strong and potentially harmful effects on the audience, especially if
they aim at suppressing information. This is the case, because consumers find it difficult – if not
impossible – to distinguish the scenario “I did not see any news about X today because nothing
important happened regarding X” from the less benign scenario “I did not see any news about
X today because, although something important happened, the media decided not to publish it.”
Game theoretic models by Puglisi (2004), Baron (2006), Besley and Prat (2006), Bernhardt et al.
(2008), and Anderson and McLaren (2012) all incorporate precisely this source of media bias, and
show its effects on public policy decisions.
More specifically, we study the intensity with which different newspapers cover different
scandals. It is relatively easy to identify scandals in a replicable manner (we use a specific set of
sources and search terms to do this), and it is also easy to count the number of newspaper stories
devoted to a given scandal relatively accurately (we use specific search strings to do this). In
this study, we focus on financial scandals such as bribery, fraud, and embezzlement. Therefore,
these scandals involving politicians have clear partisan implications – they are “bad news” for the
individual politicians implicated, and also, by association, are bad news for the party to which
the implicated politicians belong.
We investigate the following hypotheses regarding newspaper coverage of scandals. First,
partisan newspapers should devote a large amount of coverage to scandals involving politicians
of the opposing party, and less coverage – perhaps none – to scandals involving politicians of their
party.3 Second, partisan newspapers should behave this way especially if they are in a monopoly
ior. The most direct way is to examine political behavior of editorial sections, as in Erikson (1976), Ansolabehere et
al. (2006), and Ho and Quinn (2008). Another approach is to analyze the degree to which media outlets use the same
language, or cite the same sources, as political groups with existing measures of ideological positions. Examples are
Groseclose and Milyo (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010).
3 Puglisi and Snyder (2011) examine a similar issue in the modern era. Specifically, they study whether the media
coverage of political scandals is related to endorsement patterns of newspapers. They find that newspapers which
frequently endorse Democratic (Republican) candidates give more coverage to Republican (Democratic) scandals.
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position, and do not have to worry about what newspapers associated with the opposition party
are doing. Third, when they face competition, especially from a newspaper associated with the
opposition party, then they must worry about “spin control,” and may find themselves devoting
a substantial amount of coverage to scandals – even scandals involving politicians in the party
to which they are attached – in order to respond to especially critical articles published in the
opposition party’s newspapers.
Our sample contains 157 newspapers (from the America’s Historical Newspapers online archive)
and 121 scandals. Approximately 60% of the scandals involve Republican politicians. We have
collected the data on the number of articles devoted to each scandal in each newspaper. In
addition, we have collected the total number of articles published by each newspaper during the
period of each scandal. We use it to scale the number of articles devoted to the scandal itself. We
have also collected data on the partisanship and circulation for all competing newspapers in the
towns and counties of each newspaper in our sample. This allows us to construct measures of
the media market structure for each newspaper in our sample.
Our main results indicate that newspaper bias, both in favor of the newspaper’s political
party and against the opposition party, is statistically significant, substantively meaningful, and
in the expected direction. Partisan newspapers publish more articles about scandals involving
politicians from the opposition party, and they print fewer articles about scandals involving
politicians from their own party, relative to independent newspapers.
Perhaps more interestingly, we also find that as the level of competition faced by a newspaper
increases, the bias exhibited – both against the opposition party and in favor of the newspaper’s
own party – decreases. Consider a newspaper in a monopoly market. On average, this newspaper
would publish 90% more articles when a scandal involves a politician of the opposite party than
when the scandal does not. By contrast, if a newspaper faces four competitors, then the degree of
bias is only half as large as when it faces none. The results hold strong even after controlling for
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county level demographics, as well as the underlying partisanship of voters in each newspaper’s
county, and time trends.
Our paper contributes to three lines of political science and political economy literature on
media. The first is the empirical literature studying how competition affects the behavior of
media outlets. George and Waldfogel (2006) study the effect national expansion of the New York
Times on local newspapers. They show that local newspapers adopt differentiation strategy when
they face competition from the New York Times and change their target audiences providing more
local and less national news. The model in Chiang (2010) predicts that newspapers in competitive
markets will differentiate and move closer to people with extreme ideologies. Chiang (2010) tests
this with the National Annenberg Election Survey data, and finds ideologically extreme households
are more likely to read newspapers when the newspaper market is competitive. Gentzkow
et al. (2014) test whether competition increases ideological diversity in newspaper markets.
Using structural estimation and simulation methods, they show that the number of markets
with newspapers affiliated with each party, the proportion of households living in such markets,
and the share of households reading newspapers affiliated with each party increase as markets
becomes more competitive.4
Our research also contributes to the growing theoretical literature on media bias. Formal
models provide different accounts of media bias, and make different predictions regarding
whether market competition reduces bias. In the Besley and Prat (2006) model, competition pre-
vents media capture by the government, because when the number of media outlets increases, it
becomes harder for the government to bribe media outlets. In the Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006)
model, media bias emerges because media outlets want to slant their reports toward what cus-
tomers believe to build a reputation of being accurate. In competitive media markets, however,
4 Market competition need not always be associated with beneficial outcomes such as the diversity of opinions.
Zaller (1999) claims that competition lowers the quality of news, and presents evidence that competition results in
less hard news and more sensationalism. Similarly, Jacobsson et al. (2008) argue that high levels of competition are
correlated with low levels of journalistic performance.
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readers have alternative sources of information to check the accuracy of a given outlet, thus me-
dia outlets have weaker incentives to distort the news. Therefore, competition mitigates media
bias.
On the other hand, the Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) model predicts media bias can be
greater in competitive markets. Their model assumes that readers hold biased beliefs and want
to hear stories consistent with their prior views. The model predicts an increase in competition
may make media bias worse, as newspapers cater to the taste of readers more aggressively to
carve out a share of the market and make higher profits. The Anand et al. (2007) model also
predicts that competition would not necessarily reduce media bias. According to their model,
when consumer preferences are heterogeneous and most of the facts are not verifiable, media
market works similar to differentiated product market. Therefore, competition would not lead to
reduction of bias if readers’ preferences are unchanged and facts are non-verifiable.
The model in Baron (2006) gives a supply-side explanation of why media bias may persist
in competitive media markets. According to the model, a news organization may lower the cost
of hiring by granting discretion to journalists.5 However, since skepticism of customers about
media bias forces the news organization to lower price, it tolerates bias only if gains from the
supply side is greater than the losses from the demand side. Therefore, media bias is consistent
with profit maximization and may persist with competition.
Thus, while theory can guide us to some degree, there are a variety of models with a variety
of different predictions. Ultimately, the effect of market competition on media bias is an empirical
question. To our knowledge, our paper is one of the first attempts to estimate the relationship
between competition and media bias directly on a large-scale basis.6
5 The assumption is that if journalists can advance their careers or be influential by using the discretion granted by
a news organization, they are willing to work for lower wages.
6 Puglisi and Snyder (2011) find a negative but statistically insignificant effect of competition on media bias. Hong
and Kacperczyk (2010) tests whether competition reduces reporting bias in the market for security analyst earnings
forecasts. They show mergers of brokerage houses are positively correlated with optimism bias in reporting, which is
7
The third line of work to which we contribute is the literature on the historical development
of the media. Gentzkow et al. (2006) is closely related to our paper in terms of topic and time
periods. They study how U.S. newspapers covered the Cre´dit Mobilier scandal in the early 1870s
and the Teapot Dome scandal in the 1920s. The authors note that in the period between these
scandals technological progress in the printing industry, coupled with the contemporaneous in-
crease in the population and income of U.S. cities, induced an enormous growth in the size of the
newspapers’ market. In the competition for market shares and advertising revenue, newspapers
faced strong incentives to cut the ties with political parties and become (at least formally) inde-
pendent. The authors find that the coverage of the Cre´dit Mobilier scandal – which occurred in a
period dominated by partisan newspapers – was more biased than the coverage of Teapot Dome
– which occurred at a time when fewer dailies were directly linked to political parties. Petrova
(2011) explicitly analyzes the link between potential advertising revenue across U.S. cities and
entry and exit of partisan and independent newspapers during the 19th century. The author
shows that markets with high advertising revenues are likely to have independent newspapers.
Finally, Gentzkow et al. (2014) study the effect of market force on the ideological diversity using
data on U.S. newspapers from the early 20th century.
The following section describes the data and empirical strategy. We then present the main
results and robustness checks we implemented. Finally, we conclude with a short discussion of
the broader implications of the results for research on media competition and bias and possible
extensions to our study.
Data and Measures
This paper studies how the media market structure present in the period 1870-1910 in the
U.S. influenced how and whether partisan newspapers covered political scandals. In order to do
consistent with the hypothesis that competition reduces bias.
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so we put together a dataset with detailed information for 121 political scandals, including the
partisanship of the politician involved and the type of each scandal (fraud, bribery, corruption,
etc.). Additionally, we collected the number of articles about these scandals published by the 157
newspapers, and included descriptive information not only for these newspapers, but also for
their local competition. What follows is a description of our data sources and the methods we
used to build each part of the dataset.
Scandals
There is no exhaustive list of political scandals for the period we are studying. We therefore
constructed our own list using three sources. The result is a sample of 121 scandals.7 Online
Appendix Table A.2 lists each scandal, including the sources used to identify it. Some of these
scandals involve more than one politician, and some politicians were involved in more than one
scandal. In these cases we treat each politician as a separate observation, as well as each scandal
in which a same politician was involved.
The first source is the combined archives of five of the largest daily newspapers in the U.S. at
the time of study. Specifically, using ProQuest’s archive of articles of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta
Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post, we conducted searches
for all articles using a set of search terms that referred to different political offices (senator, mayor,
etc.) as well as a number of offenses and legal actions that could be taken against them (words
such as bribe, corruption, fraud, arrest, trial, etc.).8 We restricted attention to scandals in which
official legal action took place or which appeared in two or more of the five newspapers.
We chose these five newspapers to help identify scandals based on four criteria. First, all
of them were large and well established newspapers at the time. Second, they were located in
7 As previously mentioned, we focus on financial scandals such as bribery, fraud, and embezzlement.
8 The exact string used for this search is (indict* or convict* or guilty or bribe* or corrupt* or scandal or impeach*) and
(congressm?n or senator* or governor* or mayor* or representative*), where * and ? are wildcards.
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five of the largest cities in the country at the time, where they faced highly competitive media
markets, making them more likely to report scandals from both parties. Third, they broadly
cover all regions of the country – northeast, midwest, south, and west – so even though each
newspaper exhibits a regional bias, most of the country should be well covered by the five of
them combined. Finally, we could collect articles from them using the same search string and
search engine.
We do not include any of the five newspapers used to help identify scandals in our analysis,
since including them could lead to obvious biases. To be even more conservative, we also drop
all newspapers in other “large” markets – defined as markets with at least 10 newspapers –
because the market forces acting on these newspapers might be similar to those acting on the
five newspapers we used to identify scandals.
We complemented the ProQuest searches with two other sources. The first is the section
“Politicians in Trouble or Disgrace” on the website Political Graveyard.9 We chose only scandals
involving corruption while in office – most of these scandals overlapped with those we found
by searching the five newspapers. Second, we included all cases of contested elections in the
U.S. Senate in which the reasons given for the contest included accusations of bribery or fraud
in the election process, and where the Senate investigated the claims. The information is from
the Senate Historical Office, which has a section on the Senate’s website describing each contested
election, including information about the politicians involved, a summary of the case, and the
dates at which the contestation process began and ended.
Our list of scandals includes 121 observations. Table 2.1 shows that slightly over 60% of these
involve Republican politicians, which is likely due to the fact that the Republicans held a majority
of government offices during our period of study. The scandals are evenly distributed between
local and state level scandals, and these add up to 93% of the total observations.
9 See http://politicalgraveyard.com.
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Table 2.1: Scandals by Political Affiliation and by Scope
Panel A: By Political Affiliation
Number Percent
Democratic 45 37.2
Republican 76 62.8
Total 121 100
Panel B: By Geographical Scope
Number Percent
National 8 6.6
State 59 48.8
Local 54 44.6
Total 121 100
Newspaper Articles
We measure newspaper coverage by the number of articles published by each newspaper that
mention the scandal while the scandal was ongoing. For each scandal, we define the relevant time
period as follows. The period begins on the first day of the month in which the scandal began
– i.e., an official body opened an investigation, or the politician was arrested or indicted – and
the period ends on the last day of the month during which an official resolution to the scandal
occurred – i.e., the investigation was closed, the politician was convicted, acquitted, or died. The
newspapers in our data set are from the newspaper archive America’s Historical Newspapers, which
contains issues for 157 newspapers for the period 1870-1910.
To identify the newspaper articles that mention each scandal, we constructed a search string
that included the name and office of the politician involved, plus key words and phrases drawn
from the information gathered when we first identified the scandal from the sources. Then, we
constructed a separate search string tailored to each case. Two examples are (“senator tweed” or
“boss tweed”) and (“tweed ring” or tammany or embezzle* or arrest* or trial or convict*) for the final
11
Table 2.2: Newspapers by Party and by Media Market
Panel A: By Party
Number Percent
Democratic 59 34.7
Republican 82 48.2
Independent 29 17.1
Total 170 100
Panel B: By Media Market
Number Percent
1 30 9.4
2 49 15.3
3 51 15.9
4 56 17.5
5 54 16.9
6 to 10 80 25
Total 320 100
scandal involving William Tweed, and (congressman or representative) and (“star route” or “star-
route”) and (indict* or charge* or bribe* or trial* or guilty or acquit*) for the scandal involving William
Pitt Kellogg. Since there are 121 such strings and some of them fairly long, we do not list them
all here.10 To scale the number of articles, we collected the total number of articles published by
the newspaper during the relevant period of the scandal.11
Newspaper Media Markets
To describe the market environment facing each of the newspapers in our sample, we col-
lected information about the newspaper’s partisanship, frequency of publication, and circulation,
as well as the partisanship and circulation of all other newspapers in the same city or town at
10 A list with the exact search string used for each scandal is available on request. After searching we checked 2%
of the results for all the scandals by hand, to check for false positives; in some cases this led us to modify our search
strings.
11 We used PERL scripts to automate the date-collection process.
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that time. We collect this from Rowell’s American Newspaper Directory and N.W. Ayer & Son’s Amer-
ican Newspaper Annual and Directory. These were annual publications that together covered the
period 1869 to 1922, and contained information about each newspaper published in every city,
including partisanship, frequency of circulation and size of circulation, language of publication,
and other information. Since we are mainly interested in the competition between partisan news-
papers, our data set only has information for the newspapers that supported one of the major
political parties or declared themselves to be politically independent or neutral. The independent
newspapers constitute a “control group” to which we compare the Democratic and Republican
newspapers.
We collected the media market information for all of the newspapers in our sample (from
America’s Historical Newspapers). Table 2.2 has the number of newspapers according to partisan-
ship. About half of the newspapers from America’s Historical Newspapers in our sample were
Republican, almost 35% were Democratic, and a little under 20% were Independent.12 Panel B
in Table 2.2 classifies newspapers according to media market type. Since there were numerous
changes in the number of newspapers in a city, and we count each change separately, the number
of newspapers counted this way is about 320.
Newspaper Variables
The scandals in our dataset overlapped between one to four calendar years and the informa-
tion that we have available on newspapers and the media market corresponds to those calendar
years. In some cases, newspapers changed partisan affiliations during the course of a scandal.
In other cases, the media market structure facing a newspaper changed during the course of a
scandal. Since we study each scandal as a unit and in order to define each newspaper’s partisan
affiliation and market environment for each scandal, we averaged over the calendar years during
12 If a newspaper changed partisanship it appears multiple times, once for each partisan affiliation.
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which the scandal took place.
More specifically, we define a newspaper as Republican during a scandal if Rowells/Ayers
classified the newspaper as Republican for more than half of the time during the scandal period.
Similarly, we define a newspaper as Democratic during a scandal if Rowells/Ayers classified it as
Democratic for more than half of the time during the scandal period, and we define a newspaper
as Independent if Rowells/Ayers classified it as Independent for more than half of the time.
As discussed above, one reasonable hypothesis is that a newspaper will be most biased in
a monopoly situation, where it does not face any competition in its city, and that this bias will
decrease as the number of newspapers in the city increases. We use the log of the total number
of newspapers in the city to capture this effect. This is a convenient way to measure the effect
of increased competition, since it is likely that the effect of an additional newspaper is stronger
when this increases the number of newspapers in a market from 1 to 2, or 2 to 3, than when it
increases the number of newspapers from 9 to 10. In some cases the number of competitors in
a given newspaper’s market changed over the course of a scandal. Therefore, for each scandal
and newspaper we define LogNewspapers as the average number of newspapers circulating in the
newspaper’s town over the course of the scandal.
The dependent variable is RelativeHitsij, defined as the number of articles published by news-
paper j about scandal i (hij), divided by the total number of articles published by this newspaper
during the period of scandal i (Hij), minus the average number of this ratio for all the newspapers
that published articles about scandal i:
RelativeHitsij =
hij
Hij
− ∑
ni
k=1(hik/Hik)
ni
(2.1)
where ni is the number of newspapers in the sample during the period of scandal i. That is, we
study how a newspaper’s coverage deviates from the average coverage of the scandal, as a result
of the type of scandal and the partisanship of both the newspaper and the politicians involved
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in the scandals. Since the mean of hij/Hij is only .000267, or 2.67 articles per 10,000, we rescale
RelativeHits by multiplying by 10,000.
Bias in the coverage of scandals can be in two directions. A newspaper can choose to “over
cover” scandals involving politicians of the opposition party (reminding readers as much as
possible that the politicians in the opposition party are corrupt, dishonest, untrustworthy, and
generally not deserving of their votes). A newspaper can also choose to “under cover” scandals
involving politicians from its own party (possibly hoping that readers might not learn about the
scandal, or at least trying to limit the damage to the party’s reputation by not reminding readers
about the scandal). To capture the first of these, we define the variable Opposition Partyij; this
variable is equal to 1 if newspaper j and the politician involved in scandal i belong to different
parties, and it is 0 if they are attached to the same party or the newspaper is independent. To
capture the second type of bias, we define the variable OwnPartyij; this variable is equal to 1 if
newspaper j and the politician in scandal i are both affiliated with the same political party, and it
is 0 otherwise or if the newspaper is independent. Finally, putting the two types of bias together
produces a measure of the overall bias of the newspaper, i.e., how much it “over covers” scandals
related to the opposition party and “under covers” scandals related to its own party. To capture
this, we define the variable Overall Biasij = Opposition Partyij − OwnPartyij; so, Overall Biasij is
equal to -1 when both scandal and newspaper are affiliated with the same political party, it is
equal to +1 when they belong to opposite parties, and it is 0 otherwise.
It is reasonable to expect that newspapers will give more coverage to scandals that occur
within their state or in the nearby states, while scandals that pertain to politicians in offices at the
federal level will receive different treatment. In order to account for this difference in treatment,
we created three different variables: In State is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
politician involved in scandal i works in the state where newspaper j is published; In Region is a
dummy variable that equals one if the politician involved in scandal i is from a state that shares
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boundaries with the state where newspaper j is located; and National is a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the scandal involves a politician that occupies an office at the federal level.13
Newspapers also vary considerably in size, circulation, frequency of circulation, etc. To cap-
ture some of this variation we control for Newspaper Frequency, defined as 7 for daily newspapers,
3 for tri-weeklies, 2 for semi-weeklies and 1 for weeklies.
Other Data
We also include a variety of demographic and socio-economic variables, measured at the
county level. These help control for factors such as the income, urbanization, and literacy of
each newspaper in our sample. More specifically, we extract the following variables from the
U.S. census files at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR
Study 2896 by Haines 2006): total population, the number of white population, the number of
male population aged 21 and older, the number of people living in towns with 2,500 or more
residents, the number of people living in towns with 25,000 or more residents, the total dollar
value of manufacturing output, the number of people employed in manufacturing, and the total
annual wages in manufacturing. We linearly interpolate each number between census years.14
We use these variables to construct the share of white population, the share of males aged 21
and older, the share of the population living in towns with 2,500 or more people, the share of
population living in cities with 25,000 or more people, the total dollar value of manufacturing
output per-capita, and the average wage in manufacturing.15
13 We also constructed In County, a dummy variable that is equal to one if the politician involved in scandal i works
in the county where newspaper j is published. This variable turns out to be zero for all but a tiny number of cases,
and due to perfect multicollinearity is dropped it from the analysis.
14 The number of males aged 21 and older, the total dollar value of manufacturing output, the number of people
employed in manufacturing, and the total annual wages in manufacturing are missing for the year 1910. We use the
average of the 1900 and 1920 values for the year 1910 before interpolating these measures.
15 All dollar values are in 1910 dollars.
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Finally, in some specifications we also control for the partisanship of each newspapers’ market
area, using the Democratic vote share for president in the county of each newspaper in the most
recent election prior to the scandal. Define the variable Voter Partisanship, as follows. Let Dij be
the Democratic share of the vote in the county where newspaper j is published, in the presidential
election immediately prior to scandal j. Then Voter Partisanshipij = Dij if scandal j involves
a Republican politician, and Voter Partisanshipij = 1 − Dij if scandal j involves a Democratic
politician. Thus, Voter Partisanship is defined so that if voters are “cognitive dissonance avoiders”
and newspapers published articles cater to this taste, then the relationship between RelativeHits
and Voter Partisanship will be positive.16
Appendix Table A.1 contains summary statistics of all variables used in our main analysis.
Results
We estimate models of the following form:
RelativeHitsij = β0 + β1Opposition Partyij + β2 LogNewspapersij + γ￿Xij + ￿ij (2.2)
and
RelativeHitsij = β0 + β1Opposition Partyij + β2 LogNewspapersij +
β3Opposition Partyij×LogNewspapersij + γ￿Xij + ￿ij (2.3)
where Opposition Party and LogNewspapers are as described above, and Xij is a vector of control
variables. The models are similar for the other bias measures, with OwnParty or Overall Bias
16 Note that since newspaper markets are mainly towns or cities rather than whole counties, we would prefer to
measure the demographic, socio-economic, and political variables at the town level rather than the county level.
Unfortunately, these do not exist for our period of study, and constructing such measures would be an enormous if
not impossible task.
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substituted for Opposition Party.17
The first model gives a basic sense of the relationships between newspaper coverage of scan-
dals and key variables presumed to affect this coverage. It also provides a baseline estimate of
the average direction and magnitude of the bias in scandal coverage after controlling for some
of these key variables, given by β1. Given the discussion above, we expect that β1 > 0 for
Opposition Party and Overall Bias, and we expect that β1<0 for OwnParty.
The second model contains the main parameter of interest, β3, which provides an estimate of
how newspaper competition affects the bias in scandal coverage. If β1> 0 and β3< 0, or β1< 0
and β3 > 0, then an increase in the number of newspapers is associated with a decline in the
average amount of bias.
The vector of controls always includes scandal-specific fixed effects, In State, In Region, and
Newspaper Frequency. In some specifications the vector of controls also includes the county-level
demographic and socioeconomic described in the previous section, as well as a time trend. In
other specifications, the vector of controls also includes the control for voter partisanship.18
Baseline Estimates
Table 2.3 presents our “baseline” results. Columns 1-4 of the table show the estimates for the
Opposition Party bias variable, columns 5-8 show the estimates for the OwnParty bias variable,
and columns 9-12 show the estimates for the Overall Bias variable. We include scandal specific
fixed effects in all specifications. In the odd numbered columns, the additional controls are those
17 We do not run models with newspaper-specific fixed-effects, because we do not yet have enough within-
newspaper variation in the key interaction variables. Identifying the coefficient on Opposition Party×LogNewspapers
requires newspapers that had an opportunity to cover different types of scandals (some involving the opposition party
and some not) under noticeably different competitive situations. In our sample there are only a few such newspapers
– e.g., there are only 15 newspapers that had the opportunity to cover both opposition and other scandals while in
a monopoly or duopoly situation, and had the opportunity to cover both opposition and other scandals while facing
two or more competitors.
18 The variable National is never significant in any of the basic specifications, so we drop this variable.
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shown in the table. In the even numbered columns, all of the additional demographic and socio-
economic controls are included, as well as a time trend.19 Standard errors, clustered by scandal,
are in parentheses.
19 The estimates for these variables are not shown, but are available on request.
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Table 2.3: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Newspaper Frequency 0.372 0.243 0.287 0.215 0.405 0.298 0.391 0.301 0.387 0.273 0.345 0.260
(0.202) (0.215) (0.223) (0.225) (0.202) (0.210) (0.217) (0.217) (0.201) (0.212) (0.219) (0.221)
In-State Scandal 4.747 4.773 4.760 4.800 4.767 4.811 4.743 4.806 4.747 4.785 4.744 4.799
(1.429) (1.434) (1.435) (1.437) (1.423) (1.426) (1.439) (1.441) (1.426) (1.429) (1.438) (1.439)
In-Region Scandal 1.989 1.914 1.973 1.910 1.992 1.919 1.996 1.911 1.999 1.924 1.994 1.917
(0.670) (0.667) (0.674) (0.667) (0.669) (0.668) (0.674) (0.670) (0.671) (0.668) (0.676) (0.670)
Log Newspapers 0.472 0.366 -0.310 -0.479 -0.005 -0.083
(0.208) (0.209) (0.196) (0.208) (0.153) (0.159)
Opposition Party 0.859 0.863 2.462 2.396
(0.273) (0.272) (0.742) (0.759)
Opposition Party × -1.200 -1.133
Log Newspapers (0.400) (0.410)
Own Party -0.633 -0.689 -1.753 -2.085
(0.254) (0.260) (0.635) (0.676)
Own Party × 0.864 1.061
Log Newspapers (0.342) (0.369)
Overall Bias 0.440 0.450 1.266 1.282
(0.151) (0.151) (0.399) (0.399)
Overall Bias × -0.627 -0.630
Log Newspapers (0.214) (0.215)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
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Note first that by themselves the estimated coefficients on the bias variables are always statis-
tically significant, substantively meaningful, and in the expected direction. Partisan newspapers
publish more articles about scandals involving politicians from the opposition party, and they
print fewer articles about scandals involving politicians from their own party, relative to indepen-
dent newspapers. Consider, for example the coefficient on Opposition Party in column 2, which is
0.863. Recall that RelativeHits is measured in hits per 10,000 articles, and the average number of
articles per scandal in our sample is 2.74 per 10,000. The point estimate therefore implies that, on
average, partisan newspapers publish about 31% (100×0.863/2.74) more stories about a scandal
when it involves an opposition party politician. Another way to view the size of the coefficient
is to note that RelativeHits standard deviation of 5.35, so the difference between a newspaper-
scandal pair with Opposition Party = 1 and a pair with Opposition Party = 0 is about 16% of a
standard deviation in RelativeHits.
More interestingly, columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12 show that newspapers are significantly
more biased when they face less competition from other newspapers. This holds for all three
bias measures, and the estimates are statistically significant at the .05 level. In all cases, the point
estimates indicated clear differences in bias between newspapers that face little or no competition
and those that compete with many other newspapers. Consider again the Opposition Party bias
measure, and focus now on column 3. The coefficients imply that if a newspaper has a monopoly
(LogNewspapers= 0), then it will publish 2.462 more articles per 10,000 when a scandal involves
a politician of the opposite party than when the scandal does not. Since the average number
of articles per scandal in our sample is 2.74 per 10,000, this represents an amount of coverage
that is 90% above the average amount (100×2.462/2.74). By contrast, if a newspaper faces four
competitors (so LogNewspapers=Log(5)=1.609), then it will only publish 1.291 more articles per
10,000 when a scandal involves a politician of the opposite party than when the scandal does not
(2.462− 1.2×1.609+ .472×1.609). Thus, in relative terms, the degree of bias is only 52% as large
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when a newspaper faces four competitors than when it faces none.
Figure 2.1 shows the predicted relationships between the three different types of bias and the
number of newspapers, based on the point estimates from columns 3, 7 and 11 (and setting the
relevant bias variable at 1). For example, moving from 1 to 4 to 9 newspapers, the Overall Bias
falls from 1.266 to 0.39 to -.123.
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Figure 2.1: Newspaper Bias vs. Number of Competing Newspapers
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Adding Voter Partisanship
Table 2.4 shows the results when we estimate the same models reported in Table 2.3, but
also include a control for the underlying partisanship of voters in each newspaper’s county,
Voter Partisanship.20
As Table 2.4 shows, when we add Voter Partisanship, the point estimates for the bias variables
tend to increase in magnitude relative to those in Table 2.3, and remain statistically significant
at the .05 level. This is true for the simple bias variables – Opposition Party, OwnParty, and
Overall Bias – and it is also true for the coefficients of interest – Opposition Party×LogNewspapers,
OwnParty×LogNewspapers, and Overall Bias×LogNewspapers.
Perhaps surprisingly, in all columns the estimated coefficient on Voter Partisanship is negative
rather than positive; however, it is never statistically significant.21
In any case, the bottom line is that including Voter Partisanship does not weaken the estimated
relationship between competition and newspaper bias.
20 The number of observations in Table 2.4 is smaller than the number of observations in Table 2.3, because when
we add Voter Partisanship the newspapers published in U.S. territories and the District of Columbia are dropped.
21 One possible reason for the insignificant estimates is measurement error, since the Voter Partisanship variable is
measured at the county level rather than the town level.
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Table 2.4: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Newspaper Frequency 0.201 0.171 0.207 0.155 0.129 0.184 0.178 0.196 0.160 0.179 0.190 0.176
(0.216) (0.233) (0.233) (0.236) (0.219) (0.231) (0.232) (0.231) (0.217) (0.232) (0.232) (0.233)
In-State Scandal 4.789 4.853 4.830 4.888 4.801 4.895 4.859 4.923 4.787 4.869 4.842 4.903
(1.438) (1.444) (1.442) (1.446) (1.429) (1.429) (1.440) (1.442) (1.433) (1.436) (1.441) (1.443)
In-Region Scandal 1.865 1.793 1.862 1.785 1.861 1.802 1.855 1.784 1.867 1.803 1.861 1.789
(0.667) (0.656) (0.668) (0.656) (0.668) (0.657) (0.669) (0.656) (0.668) (0.657) (0.669) (0.657)
Log Newspapers 0.403 0.339 -0.882 -0.849 -0.234 -0.243
(0.242) (0.261) (0.276) (0.276) (0.167) (0.191)
Opposition Party 0.997 1.030 2.863 2.893
(0.328) (0.327) (0.879) (0.881)
Opposition Party × -1.319 -1.311
Log Newspapers (0.450) (0.454)
Own Party -0.896 -0.889 -2.897 -2.865
(0.315) (0.316) (0.883) (0.875)
Own Party × 1.403 1.401
Log Newspapers (0.450) (0.450)
Overall Bias 0.559 0.560 1.558 1.549
(0.186) (0.183) (0.471) (0.468)
Overall Bias × -0.720 -0.715
Log Newspapers (0.237) (0.237)
Voter Partisanship -1.094 -1.024 -1.406 -1.344 -1.019 -0.884 -1.402 -1.244 -1.262 -1.145 -1.571 -1.447
(0.866) (0.843) (0.875) (0.857) (0.869) (0.845) (0.902) (0.879) (0.902) (0.876) (0.923) (0.900)
Observations 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316 3316
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
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Adding Time Trends in Bias
Table 2.5 shows the results when we estimate the same models reported in Table 2.3, but also
include linear time trends in the bias terms. That is, in the regressions focusing on bias against
the opposition party, we include the variable Opposition Party×Year, in the regressions focusing
on bias in favor of one’s own party we include OwnParty×Year, and in the regressions focusing
on overall bias we include Overall Bias×Year. This allows the specifications to incorporate other
forces that might have been reducing (or increasing) bias nationwide, such as changing profes-
sional norms in journalism, and the general increase in advertising as a source of newspaper
revenue.
As Table 2.5 shows, when we add the new variables the estimated coefficients on the main
variables of interest – are similar to those in Table 2.3, and always statistically significant at the
.05 levels.
Interestingly, the estimates on the time trend variables all suggest that the level of newspaper
bias has declined over time, and all are statistically significant at the .05 or .10 level. The trends
are relatively large, also. For example, the coefficients in column 5 suggest that between 1870 and
1910 the average Overall Bias fell by 97% (from 1.856 to 0.056). This is consistent with previous
findings, such as Gentzkow et al. (2006) and Petrova (2011).
Bias in Coverage During Election Periods
We also conducted analyses focusing on newspaper coverage during election periods. More
specifically, for each scandal we identified the closest election that was held during or after the
scandal, and counted the number of articles about the scandal printed in each newspaper during
the two months leading up to election day. We then estimated the same models as in Table 3
with the election-period coverage dependent variable.
Qualitatively, the pattern of estimates when we focus on election-period coverage is quite
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Table 2.5: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Newspapers 0.376 0.296 -0.248 -0.416 -0.013 -0.076
(0.196) (0.202) (0.183) (0.196) (0.154) (0.158)
Opposition Party 2.266 2.191
(0.686) (0.699)
Opposition Party × -1.002 -0.931
Log Newspapers (0.357) (0.367)
Own Party -1.578 -1.913
(0.575) (0.620)
Own Party × 0.707 0.905
Log Newspapers (0.308) (0.338)
Overall Bias 1.158 1.173
(0.365) (0.366)
Overall Bias × -0.531 -0.532
Log Newspapers (0.192) (0.194)
Year -0.007 -0.005 -0.033 -0.034 -0.025 -0.024
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
Opposition Party × Year -0.041 -0.041
(0.018) (0.018)
Own Party × Year 0.030 0.030
(0.017) (0.017)
Overall Bias × Year -0.020 -0.020
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
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similar to that in Table 3. The magnitudes are smaller than those in Table 3, because the standard
deviation of the dependent variable is much smaller.22 For example, the estimated coefficient on
Opposition Party in Equation 2 is 0.139, and the estimated standard error is 0.070. The estimated
coefficient on Opposition Party in Equation 3 is 0.450 (standard error = 0.214), the estimated co-
efficient on LogNewspapers is 0.073 (standard error = 0.042), and the estimated coefficient on the
interaction term Opposition Party×LogNewspapers is -0.232 (standard error = 0.109). Thus, as in
the baseline specifications, the estimates indicate that newspapers exhibit bias in their election-
period scandal coverage, but the size of the bias falls as competition increases.
Conclusion
Much of the U.S. press in the 19th and early 20th centuries was highly partisan. The analysis
above indicates that this partisan bias was reflected in the amount of coverage devoted to scandals
depending on the partisan affiliations of the politicians involved. Partisan newspapers tended to
cover scandals involving the opposition party’s politicians more intensely, and they also tended
to cover scandals involving their own party’s politicians more lightly.
Perhaps more importantly, it appears that competition – measured simply as the number of
competing newspapers – reduced the degree to which partisan newspapers skewed their cov-
erage of scandals. The point estimates suggest that compared to a newspaper in a monopoly
position, a newspaper facing two competitors would on average exhibits less than 50% as much
bias in coverage intensity (using the overall bias measure), and a newspaper facing six competi-
tors would exhibit no noticeable bias.
Our sample contains 157 newspapers. This is large enough to give us enough observations to
have confidence in our regression estimates; also, we have no reason to believe that the sample is
22 In the interest of space we do not report the estimates in detail in yet another table. They are available upon
request.
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unrepresentative in ways that might bias our estimates. Nonetheless, the sample only represents
a small fraction – about 2% – of the newspapers that circulated in the U.S. during the period of
study. Enlarging the sample is crucial, especially in order to estimate models with newspaper-
specific fixed effects.
It would be especially interesting to extend the time period covered, through the 1910s and
into the 1920s. This would allow us to study whether newspapers responded to the structural
changes in political institutions that began at the start of the 20th century – such as the introduc-
tion of primary elections, the direct election of U.S. Senators, and the shift toward non-partisan
elections for local offices. One prediction is that under the direct primary, even highly partisan
voters should be interested in learning about the malfeasance of state and local politicians in their
own party, since they can vote against these politicians in the primary election. Did newspapers
respond to this demand?
Although our study is historical, our findings are relevant even today. Media market competi-
tion in general, and the decline of the newspaper industry in particular, are highly salient topics.
Readership, circulation, and advertising revenue of U.S. newspapers have all declined sharply
(in relative terms) over the past fifty years. For example, daily circulation in the U.S. dropped
from just over 1.0 newspapers per household in 1950 to about 0.3 per household in 2010. This has
been associated with a substantial consolidation in the industry, with the number of newspapers
falling from 1,772 in 1950 to 1,382 in 2011. Even some relatively large cities, such as Birmingham,
Alabama, no longer have a printed daily newspaper. Our findings suggest that this might lead to
an increase in media bias, especially in the coverage of local politics, since local politics is largely
ignored by national outlets.
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3. NON-CONFORMIST VOTING IN CUBA. INFORMED VOTER CHOICE IN AN
AUTHORITARIAN ELECTION1
How do voters approach elections for which the number of candidates equals the number of
seats? Do such voters find nooks and crannies in the authoritarian election design to exercise
some choice? What informational clues may they employ? Are there whiffs in their choices that
may set up pre-transition circumstances for subsequent political change? Cuba’s 2013 National
Assembly election provides us with a rare opportunity to examine these questions.
We find, contrary to expectations, that Cuban voters make choices even in elections where
the number of candidates equals the number of seats. These choices are not based on clientelist
incentives, regime mobilization, or fear. Voters signal disinterest in, or approval of, candidates
based on the information gathered about the candidates, albeit within the framework of the
political regime. Voters support candidates who have grassroots links and some experience of
local multi-candidate electoral contestation; this is the voters principal information short-cut
to evaluate retrospective performance. In so proceeding, voters have yet to reject the Cuban
Communist Party, whose leaders they sometimes endorse.
Scholars of other authoritarian regimes that schedule elections point often to clientelist mech-
anisms to explain aspects of voting behavior (Blaydes 2011; Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). We
find little evidence of clientelistically-motivated voting in Cuba. And for the first time in the
1 Joint with Jorge I. Domı´nguez and Chiara Superti, Harvard University. We are grateful to Aaron Watanabe for
his excellent research assistance and for comments from participants at the Harvard University Comparative Politics
Workshop and the Latin American Politics Workshop. All errors are our sole responsibility.
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2013 election, we find little evidence of vote mobilization or coercion. Instead, Cuban voters em-
ploy the information available, making use of their level of education and their direct experience
with local inter-candidate elections. The further from the City of Havana, the key explanation
for voting in National Assembly elections is the prior grassroots experience: vote for National
Assembly Deputy for a friend or neighbor first elected in a multi-candidate local election. The
outcomes of past local elections matter more to inform voters for National Assembly elections if
they live far from the City of Havana or if they are less educated, and matter less near Havana
or if voters’ education levels are higher, in which case voters may use their education to find
additional information about candidates and can compensate for the lack of direct experience
with national politicians.
The bulk of the scholarly literature on elections in authoritarian regimes focuses on why
authoritarian regime elites would allow and run regular elections (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009),
or examine the limited possibilities for electoral competition in competitive authoritarian regimes
(Levitsky and Way 2010). As Brownlee (2011, 823) puts it, such elections are “political safety
valves.” Such research has focused on outcomes for the political regime, not on voting behavior.
We seek to understand voting behavior in a communist political system, mindful of regime
consequences but focused on the choices of voters. Elections in communist systems have varied
considerably. The Peoples Republic of China, at one end, does not have direct elections for its na-
tional parliament; members of the National Peoples Congress are chosen indirectly. The former
Soviet Union had direct elections for the Supreme Soviet. In Soviet national elections, the number
of candidates equaled the number of seats, with only one candidate per seat per district. Voters
could abstain, vote blank, or void the ballot but had no ability to choose between candidates com-
peting against each other (Gilison 1968). In Poland, at first the consolidated communist regime
emulated the Soviet approach in time for the 1952 national parliamentary (Sejm) elections but,
after the 1956 peaceful and limited revolution, Poland adopted a new electoral law. It permitted
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multiple candidates for each seat and it permitted multiple parties to nominate candidates, but
it did not permit opposition parties. There were 750 candidates for 459 seats in the 1957 Sejm
election. Candidates were elected from various parties, with a plurality for the Communists, but
all elected Deputies were members of the government coalition (Staar 1958). Research on Poland
rarely focused on elections and, when it did, the emphasis was also on regime outcomes, not
voting behavior.
Communist Vietnams elections stand at the other end of the spectrum and are the most per-
tinent reference; excellent research by Malesky and Schuler permits a comparison with Cuba.
The 2007 National Assembly election in Vietnam featured at least two candidates for every na-
tional parliamentary seat. Most centrally nominated candidates won but just under half of the
locally nominated candidates won. Only one self-nominated candidate won a National Assem-
bly seat; all other elected parliamentarians had official sponsorship at the central or the local
level. Vietnams Communist Party leaders assigned centrally-nominated candidates to safe seats,
guaranteeing a good electoral outcome for these national leaders. Members of the Political Bu-
reau and the Central Committee of the Communist Party performed best, as did incumbents in
general. Local politicians, however, ran in less-safe districts, which explains why they performed
less well (Malesky and Schuler 2009; Malesky and Schuler 2011). Are electoral outcomes the
same in Cuba, with weakest support for politicians rooted mainly in local politics?
Cubas electoral system stands between the ends of the communist-regime spectrum. Unlike
China, Cuba has had direct elections for its National Assembly since the early 1990s. Like the
Soviet Union, the number of candidates has equaled the number of posts but, unlike the So-
viet Union, Cuba clusters candidates in districts, yielding differentiated outcomes for candidates
who are nevertheless assured of election. Like Poland and Vietnam, Cuban elections thus permit
comparisons between the shares of votes for each candidate. Unlike Poland and Vietnam, no Na-
tional Assembly Deputy has yet been defeated in Cuba, where defeat is legally possible because,
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for election, the law requires winning more than half the valid votes cast. Thanks to a unique
data set for Cubas 2013 National Assembly election, we show how voters used a non-democratic
election to make some choices without subverting the regime. In contrast to the experience in
Vietnam, we will show that locally-rooted politicians performed best in this Cuban election, and
that support for Political Bureau and Central Committee members was middling.
In Cuba, the state owns and operates all television and radio stations and all the daily newspa-
pers. Individual candidate campaigning is prohibited, as is financing for individual campaigns.
Only the Communist Party of Cuba is legal; the number of candidates equals the number of seats.
In such a low-information authoritarian context in Cuba, voters must look for the few available
clues. They know about the national leaders, above all members of the Communist Party Political
Bureau who appear in the official mass media. But they have some additional means to learn
about candidates. One is a set of officially-generated short biographies of each National Assem-
bly candidate; these are posted in each district and are visible at or near the polling places. The
other is that Cubas municipal elections feature two candidates for every seat, and many of these
municipal assembly officials are also nominated to run for the National Assembly. At the local
level, therefore, the election and performance of the municipal assembly official chosen through
a local multi-candidate election provides key information these are the only politicians voters
had chosen in elections featuring inter-candidate choice.
Since the early 1990s, from a tenth and rising to a quarter of Cuba’s voters have not voted as
the “official line” has indicated although, in this communist single-party system, citizens have
not been able to vote against the political regime or the Communist Party of Cuba. We define
a nonconforming voter as a citizen who goes to the polls to vote and chooses to cast a ballot
that is blank, void, or not for the officially recommended united slate (to be explained below).
Nonconforming voters show up to vote; abstention from voting may occur not only for political
but also for nonpolitical reasons.
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There are two puzzles. One is election turnout. Scholars of democratic societies have long
pondered why any voter would turn out to vote when any voters impact on the outcome would
be tiny (Aldrich 1993, Downs 1957, 260-276). The other puzzle is why do voters vote selectively.
In Cuba’s National Assembly elections, where the number of candidates equals the number of
seats, a voters impact on the choice of a National Assembly Deputy has been exactly zero. Yet,
in the 2013 National Assembly election, 1,846,691 (Calculated from “Resultados finales” 2013)
Cubans cast nonconforming ballots (23.5 percent of voters). In this article, we focus on the
second puzzle why are some candidates rewarded more than others and shed some light on
the first puzzle.
Cubans exercise choice in these single-party elections in ways that evoke the behavior of vot-
ers in many countries (Blais et al. 2002; Tavits 2010). However, in Cuba this selective voting
neither rejects nor endorses the Communist Party; instead, it reveals a relatively neutral stance
with regard to the official institutions (the Communist Party and the government). Voters support
candidates who have grassroots links and some experience of local electoral contestation between
candidates (where one candidate wins and another one loses, which we call multi-candidate elec-
tions) or have earned recognition for their deeds, not just their political affiliation. In the stronger
support for local over national politicians, Cuban voters differ markedly from Vietnamese voters.
Background
We focus on the February 2013 National Assembly election because it is the first for which
the government published the pertinent data and the first for which official institutions did not
intensively campaign in favor of casting a ballot for the entire official single slate.
By 2013, Cuban voters had reasons for concern. Cuba’s gross domestic product per capita
in constant prices fell 34 percent from 1990 to 1993, when the first direct election was held for
the National Assembly. There followed a slow recovery until the start of the new century, then
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a growth spurt in mid-decade, followed by a marked deceleration, and then very slow growth
since the 2008-09 financial crisis (Pe´rez Villanueva 2004, 51; Pe´rez Villanueva 2012, 22; Pe´rez
Villanueva 2015). This growth slowdown coincided with Rau´l Castro’s replacement of his brother
Fidel as Cuba’s president (acting president August 2006-February 2008, president since then) and
preceded the spike in nonconformist voting in the 2013 election.
By 2013, the voters may have felt freer to choose. Cuba experienced a gradual opening of the
public sphere under Rau´l Castro’s presidency. There was a more open and vigorous debate at
the University of Havana regarding economic and social policies. In the 1990s, Temas a social
sciences journal written for a general university-educated reader, began publication and, during
Rau´l Castro’s years, widened its scope. In 2005, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Havana
launched a new magazine, Espacio Laical, to address contemporary topics in Cuban society,
economy, politics, and diaspora, not just religious topics. In 2008, the communist party’s offi-
cial newspaper, Granma, resumed publication once a week of letters-to-the-editor, which it had
suspended a quarter century earlier (“De la Direccio´n” 2008). Subsequently, Granmas digital
edition began to publish comments on some of its articles. In 2011, Cuba had only 70 personal
computers per thousand people and 232 people per thousand had some Internet access (Orga-
nizacio´n Nacional de Estadı´stica e Informacio´n 2012, Table 17.4); thus only middle-class users
access the Granma digital edition. Yet, those who do, argue vigorously. For example, in the
four days following publication of a new foreign investment law in 2014, comments posted on
Granma’s site sharply criticized aspects of the new law (“Texto de la ley...” 2014). Similarly in
February 2015, in anticipation of upcoming municipal elections, the newspaper Juventud Re-
belde (“Concluyo´ entrevista...” 2015) hosted an online forum about the Cuban electoral system
that generated significant criticisms. (To be sure, Internet traffic has grown as well outside offi-
cial sites.) Discourse widened even within the Castro family. President Rau´l Castro’s daughter,
Mariela, became a public advocate for gay rights, helping to shift the Cuban government from
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its hitherto homophobic policies (1960s to 1980s). In a seemingly off the cuff remark at the De-
cember 2010 National Assembly plenary meeting, Rau´l Castro remarked, “Why do we have to
butt in on people’s lives?” Granma reported that the National Assembly burst into applause –
the only such interruption during the entire meeting.
This greater openness of the public sphere and the serious economic constraints are consistent
with Brownlees (2011) argument that elections in non-communist authoritarian regimes open a
political safety valve that allows officials to collect information from this behavior, which in
different ways Chinese officials do as well (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013).
Cuba’s Electoral System
Cuban revolutionary forces seized power in January 1959. The first national parliamentary
elections were held only in 1976. From 1976 to 1991, Cubans voted directly only for municipal
assembly candidates, who serve for 2.5-year terms, renewable; municipal assemblies chose the
members of the provincial assemblies and the Deputies of the National Assembly. Deputies serve
for five-year terms, renewable. The first National Assembly met in December 1976; 91.7 percent of
the Deputies were communist party members and another 5 percent were members of the party’s
youth wing, the Communist Youth Union. At that first National Assembly, 55.5 percent of the
Deputies had also been elected as municipal assembly officials and were thus performing double
duty. The remaining 44.5 percent of the Deputies were government and party officials, never
elected in a direct election, who were chosen to become Deputies by the municipal assemblies
(Domı´nguez 1978, 243-247). Since 1976, the National Assembly has met twice, at most three
times per year, and each time for just a few days, including the committee hearings in the week
before plenary sessions. It is not onerous for a municipal assembly member or a government
official to serve as a Deputy while also holding a regular job. Cuba’s National Assembly has
never defeated a government bill and never approved a bill introduced by Deputies without
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prior executive support.
In response to the collapse of European communist regimes in 1989-1991 and the massive
protests at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, Cubas Fourth Communist Party Congress in 1991
amended the Constitution and the electoral law. In October 1992, the National Assembly ap-
proved the new electoral law to render it even more “perfect”, as its Preamble notes (for the
law in effect for the 2013 election, “Ley Electoral” 2005; for a sympathetic account, August 2013,
chapter 7; for a critique published in Cuba, Rafuls Pineda 2014). The following are the key char-
acteristics of the National Assemblys elections. The first four have detracted from the scholarly
study of these elections; items five through seven indicate the variation that permits our analysis,
notwithstanding single-party single-candidate-per-post elections.
1. Single party. The Communist Party of Cuba is the only lawfully authorized party (Consti-
tution, Article 5).
2. Self-nomination is prohibited. Deputy candidates for the National Assembly are screened
by candidacy commissions whose members are drawn from the officially-sponsored mass
organizations of workers, women, peasants, university and secondary school students, and
the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Ley Electoral, Article 68). These candi-
dacy commissions submit their recommendations (at least two names for each candidacy,
Ley Electoral, Article 89) to the municipal assembly’s candidacy commission for each mu-
nicipality. Every candidacy is thus politically vetted in advance.
3. One post, one candidate. Only the municipal assembly chooses Deputy candidates and it
must choose only one candidate for each post to be filled (Ley Electoral, Article 92).
4. Posting photos and biographies, and limiting campaigns. Only the electoral district com-
missions – not the candidates– may draft the biographies and post them and the photos
of the candidates (Ley Electoral, Article 30ch). These biographies follow a standard format
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and are posted outside each voting location for voters to see prior to voting. There is no
candidate campaigning.
5. Multiple candidates per district. While the number of candidates equals the number of
posts, each district votes on at least two candidates for two posts. The most populous
electoral districts may elect more Deputies, though the number of candidates always equals
the number of posts to be filled (Ley Electoral, Articles 14 and 15).
6. Voter choice. A voter “may vote for as many candidates as may appear on the ballot, with
an X next to each name, but if “the voter wishes to vote for all the candidates [the voter]
may write an X at the circle that appears at the top of the ballot (Ley Electoral, Article
110). The voter may leave the ballot blank, or void it. To be elected Deputy, a candidate
must win more than half of the valid votes cast (blank and void votes are not counted as
valid votes). In multi-candidate municipal assembly elections, many candidates fail to win
a majority of the valid votes on the first-round election; a second-round election must be
held between the top two vote-getters. No Deputy candidate for the National Assembly
has been defeated but the legal possibility exists.
7. Candidate variation. Municipal assembly candidacy commissions may choose up to 50
percent of the Deputy candidates from among the members of the municipal assembly
(Ley Electoral, Article 93). Deputy candidates who are not municipal assembly members
need not reside in the district where they become candidates.
Therefore, the Cuban electoral law makes it possible for every voter to support el voto unido,
marking an X for the entire official slate, or to vote for some but not all of the candidates even
though all of the candidates will be elected. Voters may thus express support or displeasure at
the voting booth in three ways: voting blank, voiding the ballot, or voting selectively, the sum
of which we call nonconformist voting. Figure 3.1 shows the ballot. It prominently features the
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Figure 3.1: Example of Ballot
option for the official united slate front and center, and then it lists the individual candidates in
the event that the voters choose to vote for some but not all of them.
Note the relationship between candidacies for National Assembly and municipal assembly elec-
tions. The same Ley Electoral (Article 82) mandates that the number of candidates for the mu-
nicipal assemblies must be at least two per local post to be filled. Municipal assembly elections
are multi-candidate albeit single-party, with the same constraints on campaigning noted above.
Members of municipal assemblies are also vetted as candidates for the National Assembly. There-
fore, in National Assembly Deputy elections, the amount of voter information regarding the can-
didates differs. Some Deputy candidates will be national officials in government and party, not
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elected to the municipal assemblies; other Deputy candidates will be better known at the local
level because they had been previously elected to the municipal assemblies.
Three mechanisms underscore the salience and competitive challenges of municipal assembly
officials. First, municipal assembly delegates are locally elected in multi-candidate elections.
They face competition not only once they are on the ballot but also in getting placed on the
ballot to run for re-election; for the 2015 municipal elections, for example, only 60 percent of
the incumbent municipal delegates were renominated (“Un paso ma´s cerca de elegir” 2015).
Second, the law requires municipal assembly delegates to be accountable twice a year at a public
assembly of constituents and to listen to their requests. Official statistics aver that over a fifth of
the population attends such events (Amaro 1996). Between 2012 and 2015, citizens voiced nearly
1.2 million requests to their municipal representatives, of which three-quarters were reported
as having been “solved” (“Elector-planteamiento-delegado” 2015). Third, municipal delegates
act as problem solvers. As a Granma columnist put it, voters expect them to become a “one-
man band,” noting also the risk that delegates would breach the law (Marro´n Gonza´lez 2015).
Because the allocation of resources remains very highly centralized, no municipal delegate may
easily engage in clientelist electoralist practices, familiar in other countries, without the risk of
arrest (“Las pro´ximas elecciones” 2015). Nevertheless, jointly the multi-candidate local election,
the accountability assemblies, and the problem-solving work render the municipal delegate an
attractive political figure with significant roots in a community.
Voting Context: Non-conformist voting matters
Senior officials have kept track of nonconformist voting. For example, following the nation-
wide April 2000 municipal elections, the president of the national election council (Comisio´n
Electoral Nacional – CEN), Roberto Dı´az Sotolongo, noted with satisfaction that voting absten-
tion had dropped from the 1997 nationwide municipal election and that the proportion of blank
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and void ballots had also fallen (Table 3.1, below). The CEN President added that voting in Cuba
offered the option of voting for no candidate (Mayoral 2000).
The salience of the elections is also evident because neighborhood Committees for the De-
fense of the Revolution, or groups of students, are officially tasked to contact voters to turn out,
and job promotions or the allocation of benefits often include verification of having voted. These
contacts increase turnout but may also create apprehension about the possible adverse conse-
quences of voter abstention. (Lo´pez 1993, 52; Guanche 2012, 78). Moreover, the leading mass
organizations have publicly urged voters to cast their ballot for the single slate (“Llama la CTC
al voto unido” 2008). The official newspaper’s report on the 2008 National Assembly election
highlighted the “triumph of the united vote” (“¡Triunfo´ el voto unido!” 2008), thereby calling
attention to nonconformist voting.
Cuban scholars have also highlighted the salience of elections. As Julio Ce´sar Guanche puts
it, “voters have responded highly and positively to the official requests for the united vote – for
all the candidates – alongside with low blank and void voting... The elections have served as
‘virtual’ plebiscites...” on revolutionary rule (Guanche 2012, 71; see also Valde´s Paz 2009, 149-
170). Nonconformist voting matters.
In the early 1990s, the novelty was the direct election for national deputies, which gave voters
the option to cast nonconforming national votes for the first time. Although Cubas government
and economy were shaken badly by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies, Cuban lead-
ers had faith that their communist party was different. Cuban scholars had carried out detailed
research for the 1989 municipal elections. They found, first, that the communist party as an
institution did not add much value to a candidacy. Only two percent of 150 voters surveyed
mentioned membership in the communist party as a “desirable” quality in a municipal assembly
candidate. Second, voters supported their friends and neighbors who were good in the commu-
nity, worked hard, and were interpersonally effective. Third, seven out of ten Cuban municipal
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assembly members elected in 1989 were communist party members, who were good workers,
friends, and neighbors. Communist party candidates, as human beings, added value to a party
that lacked popular prestige (Dilla, Gonza´lez, and Vicentelli 1994, 69-73). The Cuban leadership
hoped that party members could rescue the party and lead the way out of the crisis blamed on
the European communist collapse.
Cubans re-enacted V. O. Keys observations made in the 1940s regarding the voting behavior
in the U.S. southern states. As Key wrote about voting in South Carolina in a section he called
“Friends and Neighbors”, “in the absence of well-organized politics,” as in the one-party political
regime then prevalent in that state, “localism will play a powerful role in the orientation of the
voters’ attitudes.” In Alabama, “the friends-and-neighbors pattern reflects the absence of well-
organized competing factions” (Key 1949, 132, 41). Cuban National Assembly elections, we will
now show, feature such “friends-and-neighbors” effects.
Table 3.1: Nonconforming voting for Cuba’s National Assembly elections (percentages)
1993 2008 2013
Selective vote 4.6 8.7 17.6
Blank and void vote 7.0 4.8 5.9
Nonconforming vote 11.6 13.5 23.5
Source: Granma, March 11, 1993; January 30, 2008;
and February 8, 2013.
In the first direct election for the National Assembly (1993), blank and void voting matched
the pattern from municipal elections (Table 3.1). It took voters until the 2008 election, the first
under Rau´l Castro, to prefer the selective vote, which became the dominant means for noncon-
forming voting by the 2013 National Assembly election. In 2013, the official press refrained from
calling for el voto unido for the first time ever (August 2014, 89), though the ballot itself did not
change. In 2013, nearly a quarter of Cuban voters were nonconformists – over 1.8 million voters.
The Cuban press reported the results but did not comment on them, nor did Cuban officials
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refer in public positively or negatively to this result. They could have celebrated a democratic
opening; they could have evinced embarrassment that the united slate had fallen significantly,
but they did neither.
Embarrassing the Powerful?
In Vietnam, the Communist party protected many central national leaders from electoral
embarrassment. In Cuba, the Communist party protected fewer. Consider some candidates from
the fourteen-member Communist Party Political Bureau (the country’s top political leaders) who
ran in 2013 in Havana province. Marino Murillo, the economic policy tsar, came in third and
last in District 1, Plaza de la Revolucio´n. His first vice minister, Adel Yzquierdo, also came in
third and last in District 1, Playa. The two candidates who beat Murillo were municipal assembly
delegates. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodrı´guez also came in third and last in District 2, Diez de
Octubre, defeated as well by a municipal delegate. La´zara Lo´pez Acea, First Secretary of the
Communist Party in Havana province, came in fourth and last in District 2, Boyeros; the award-
winning visible chief of the national weather bureau won the district. Armed Forces Minister
General Leopoldo Cintras and National Assembly President Esteban Lazo won their districts in
Arroyo Naranjo but each just by two percentage points.
Political Bureau members who ran for the National Assembly in eastern Cuba did better
but won no landslides. In Santiago province, Interior Minister General Abelardo Colome´ won
District 1 in Contramaestre, as did Army Corps General A´lvaro Lo´pez Miera in District 5, City
of Santiago, each by a percentage point over the next candidate. National Second Secretary of
the Communist party, Jose´ Ramo´n Machado, led by three points in District 1, Guanta´namo.
The worst outcome was Salvador Garcı´a Mesas, long-time leader of the Central Confederation
of Labor (CTC), who trailed by nearly nine percentage points, in a two-member district, Santa
Cruz del Sur, Camagu¨ey. A strong endorsement, in Santa Clara’s District 3, went to Miguel
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Dı´az-Canel, Rau´l Castros designated successor, who led the next candidate by thirteen points.
President Rau´l Castro, with 98.046 percent of the votes in San Luis, led the other candidate by
twelve percentage points. His brother Fidel only got 94.727 percent in District 7, City of Santiago,
both brothers running in Santiago province. But Rau´l may have noticed that, nationally, he was
only the fourth highest vote winner.
In short, unlike in Vietnam, Communist party national leaders were not shielded frommediocre
election results and those mediocre results give us greater confidence that the votes were counted
as they were cast. Running in Havana province was tough. Had the Cuban leaders behaved like
Vietnamese leaders, many more of the Cuban leaders would have been candidates in eastern
Cuba, where the Castro brothers and top Generals won. These observations preview our statisti-
cal analysis: top national leaders did acceptably but did not outperform.
Hypotheses
These six hypotheses may be set in the comparative context with Vietnam. If Cuba were
like Vietnam, incumbents would do best, as would Communist party members and especially
members of its Political Bureau and Communist party the first three hypotheses. In contrast,
we show that Cubans are more likely to support municipally-rooted National Assembly Deputy
candidates as well as those who earned job-related merits the fourth and fifth hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 Incumbents running for re-election should win more votes. If they do not, it may
reflect dissatisfaction with their performance.
Hypothesis 2 Communist party Deputy candidates should obtain more votes than non-communist-
party candidates. This implies that the leadership’s hunch was correct in the early 1990s:
voters valued individuals who belonged to the party. Disproving the hypothesis implies
that the threat to the regime was greater.
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Hypothesis 3 Members of the Political Bureau, the Council of State, the Cabinet, and the party’s
Central Committee should win more votes than those who are not.
Hypothesis 4 Deputy candidates previously elected at multi-candidate municipal assembly elec-
tions should win more votes in Deputy elections than Deputy candidates not previously
elected to local office. Voters value candidates for their local roots and for their winning
an inter-candidate election. This implies that the leadership’s democratizing hunch in 1992
may have been correct. The question for voters is not the communist party as such but
whether Deputies have grassroots bases. Disproving this hypothesis implies that voters
know national figures best and lack information about politicians active mainly at the local
level.
Hypothesis 5 Voters should support people who get things done. Those who have earned awards
for their hard work or served in international missions should win more votes.
Hypothesis 6 The outcomes of past local elections matter more to inform voters for National
Assembly elections if they live far from the City of Havana, and matter less near Havana.
It matters less where voter education levels are higher and where voters may use their
education to find additional information about candidates. The grassroots premium works
as an information short-cut where education is lower and voters lack alternative means
to inform themselves. If distance and education are orthogonal to each other yet have
this joint effect, then clientelism is unlikely to explain the grassroots premium for National
Assembly elections because, under clientelism, the grassroots premium should be unrelated
to distance from Havana.
For control purposes, we also look at the provincial assemblies. Cubans also vote directly for
members of the provincial assemblies. In provincial elections, the number of candidates also
equals the number of seats; other constraints on nominations and campaigns apply as well. We
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expect that a candidacy for the National Assembly is neither stronger nor weaker if the National
Assembly candidate had been previously elected to a provincial assembly. Unlike the multi-
candidate municipal elections, the provincial elections are neither contested between candidates
at risk of defeat on election day nor connect to grassroots bases. The voter obtains little additional
information from provincial assembly elections.
In addition, in 2013 President Rau´l Castro had indicated his priorities for the election. He
was especially pleased that women were 48.86 percent of the Deputies; the respective statistic
for blacks and mestizos was 37.9 percent. Moreover, he was pleased that 67.26 percent of the
Deputies were on their first term (Castro 2013). Yet, we have no reason to think that any of these
considerations matter much for the voters.
Data
We collected and coded the biographies of all National Assembly members elected in 2013.
The biographies include a photograph, information about the life of the candidates, educational
background, employment, awards won, participation in various organizations, and previous po-
litical experience. In 2013, 621 candidates entered the assembly, of whom 301 were women and
500 had a university degree. One third of the candidates mention CCP membership and 27 per-
cent were incumbents. We also have data on each candidates vote share in 2013; it ranged from
99.993 percent to 66.629 percent. Both the biographies and the vote shares were published by
Granma, the official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party. The data about the municipali-
ties come from the Anuarios Estadı´sticos Municipales 2013,2 while their distance from the capital
city of each municipality is taken from google maps.
2 Available at http://www.one.cu/aedm2013.htm.
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The Variables
We examine whether a Deputy candidate’s participation in a prior multi-candidate local mu-
nicipal election affects the likelihood of winning more votes in a Deputy election where no candi-
date loses. Does prior experience as delegado municipal, as compared to other types of experiences
in the National Assembly or in the provincial assembly, which lack multi-candidate competition,
affect the vote shares in the National Assembly Deputy elections?
We control for gender and race, collected from the candidates’ biographies. The race variable
was assigned by the coders who looked at the pictures and by comparing the candidates to a skin
color chart (LAPOP Baro´metro de las Ame´ricas 2012);3 in some specifications, we dichotomized
this variable using only black and white.
We also control for level of education. The majority of representatives (500) have at least a
university degree and 121 have a post-graduate degree. We assigned a score of 0 to those with
lower than a high-school level of education, 1 for high-school only, 2 for university degrees, and
3 for higher-than-university degrees.
We distinguish with dummy variables those candidates who have performed some interna-
tionalist service reported in the biography. The types of experiences vary. They include high-
ranking political roles, such as Rodrigo Malmierca Dı´az who has been the Cuban ambassador for
the European Union, the United Nations, Belgium and Luxemburg; international academic train-
ing, as in the case of Marino Alberto Murillo Jorge who got his Economics degree in Moscow; or
development tasks (“misio´n internacionalista”) in various countries.
We identify whether an individual was awarded some special recognition. The most common
award is the “Vanguardia Nacional” (National Vanguard), which is awarded based on outstand-
ing performance in different realms.
3 We used the same chart used by the 2012 LAPOP survey. It has a scale of 11 skin colors, which is used to classify
the respondents of the survey.
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We insert variables that describe a parliamentarian’s previous political or institutional expe-
rience, such as having been (or being) part of the FAR, the “Revolutionary Armed Forces,” or
being (or having been) a member of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP). Within Communist
Party membership, we distinguish between the posts held by the members.
We code for the previous experiences of the elected members of an assembly. We include
provincial delegates elected previously through a non-competitive election for the provincial
assembly, incumbents from the same National Assembly running for reelection, municipal del-
egates who have been through a multi-candidate municipal-assembly election, or those “new to
electoral politics,” a first time candidate who has never run in any election.
To test our hypotheses, we run models with different specifications. The first model, with
district fixed effects, compares the vote share of the few individuals who run within the same
district. This model keeps constant the political, economic, demographic, and cultural features
of each district that might otherwise impact voting behaviors.
A second model analyzes the vote share’s determinants across all candidates (within provinces).
This model allows us to control for the district magnitude (i.e. the number of seats assigned to
each district), which ranges from 2 to 5. The median district is size 3, but the most common
district magnitude is 2. Given this distribution of district magnitudes, we operationalized this
concept into two dichotomous variables that identify large versus small districts depending on
two benchmarks: the mode (2) and the median (3).
In the section testing the explanatory mechanism, we include two variables at the municipal
level. We calculate education as the number of secondary-school graduates who graduated in
2013 as a proportion of the population between the age of 15 and 19 for that year in a municipality.
We also employed it as a dummy variable for high education, using as a threshold the third
quintile of the distribution.
We measure as well distance of any municipality to the centrally located Plaza de la Revolucio´n
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of vote share. The vertical lines represent one and two standard deviations from
the mean of the distribution
in the City of Havana, calculating from google maps distance in kilometers and distance in
minutes of driving; the latter measures the challenges of transportation.
The dependent variable is the individual candidate vote share across all districts. Figure 3.2
shows its distribution, which goes from a minimum of .67 to a theoretical maximum of 1. The
majority (95 percent) of the candidates receive a vote share between 80 and 97 percent.
Does Experience Matter?
In Figure 3.3, we show the distribution of vote share for candidates who had been elected
delegados municipales in multi-candidate election only, those who were delegados provinciales only,
and those who were never elected in any election. In general, experience in electoral politics
pays off. The difference between those who had previous experience and first-time candidates
is substantively important and statistically significant at 1 percent, which represents a 1/4 of a
standard deviation of the distribution of votes.
In Table 3.2, we test the claim that the prior experience of having won a multi-candidate local
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election, defeating another candidate for the same post, and being elected delegado municipal,
will increase the vote share of a Deputy candidate. The coefficient on the dummy variable
delegado municipal is systematically larger and more significant statistically than other explanatory
variables across all specifications (see also Figure 4).
In the first two columns, we control for district fixed effects. In the first column, we compare
only the different previous political experiences known to the voter. Previous experience as an
elected municipal assembly delegate plays the most important role, while being an incumbent
is slightly helpful. In the second column, we test for all the information known to the voter
through the biographies posted at the voting precinct. Previous contested election as a municipal
assembly delegate remains significant and most important. Voters also reward candidate merit,
such as winning a workplace award and also some international experience. Incumbent advan-
tage vanishes, and none of the other political or demographic variables matter. (In the third
and fourth columns, we do not control for district dummies but only for provincial dummies
to allow us to verify the relationship between the vote share and the number of seats assigned
in the different districts (M); we cluster the standard errors at the district level. Larger district
magnitude is negatively correlated with the average vote share received by the candidates: votes
are dispersed between more candidates, and other variables matter less, not surprisingly.)
Membership in the Communist Party, being a government minister or a military officer, or
having been elected in noncompetitive provincial assembly elections, was never statistically sig-
nificant. That is, voters sometimes supported candidates with such traits but just as often they
did not. No demographic or socio-economic variable has any predictive power. The clearer find-
ing is that candidates who have previously won a local contested election are also likely to obtain
more votes in a National Assembly election.
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Figure 3.4: Premium in vote share from having been a municipal delegate, a provincial delegate, or a
National Assembly incumbent. These coefficients are taken from the full model with district
fixed effects in Table 3.2
The Grassroots Premium: Information Short-Cut or Clientelism?
Grassroots links, we have shown, impart a premium to National Assembly candidacies. Is
that because municipal officials who subsequently run for National Assembly Deputy engage
successfully in vote buying and voter coercion? Or is it because voters recognize candidates
with local links more readily and value them for the local engagement grassroots links as an
information short-cut for quality candidates? We show that the information short-cut explanation
works.
In a low information context, grassroots connections substitute for wider knowledge: they
are an easy-to-use short-cut (Shugart et al. 2006). National Assembly candidates who have been
municipal delegates are more likely to be known in the district because they have competed in
multi-candidate elections and have worked to earn their reputations.
We proceed in the following way. Recall that Cuba features an authoritarian election context
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Table 3.2: Experience in Electoral Politics
Dependent Variable: Candidates’ Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Delegado Municipal 0.00949∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.00541 0.0120∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Delegado Provincial 0.00301 0.00416 0.00488 0.00505
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Incumbent 0.00824∗ 0.00460 0.00109 0.00103
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Communist Party 0.00557 0.00625 0.00357 0.00356
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Ministro 0.00444 -0.000856 0.00894 0.00824
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Color 0.0000650 0.000205 0.000232
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender -0.00160 -0.00189 -0.00152
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Education -0.00210 -0.00381 -0.00383
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
International Experience 0.00813∗ 0.00469 0.00445
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
FAR 0.00816 0.00539 0.00547
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Awards 0.0111∗∗ 0.00512 0.00476
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
M>2 -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
M>2 ∗ Delegado Mun. -0.0107
(0.007)
Observations 610 610 610 610
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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where little political information is available. In municipalities peopled with less well-educated
individuals who are less capable of being exposed to wider political information, voters are
more likely to be aware mainly of the local career of National Assembly Deputy candidates. In
contrast, in municipalities with highly educated people or in areas closer to the capital city of
Havana, it is easier to obtain alternative sources of information about the candidates and to have
been exposed more to the national candidates whose work is mainly in Havana; the grassroots
National Assembly election premium drops in these instances. The observable implication is
a positive relationship between longer distance and higher vote share for municipal delegates,
and a negative relationship between vote share and higher education of voters. In this respect,
education and distance may be substitutes in the process to acquire information.
Alternatively, a clientelist explanation of the premium imparted by grassroots links to Na-
tional Assembly candidates focuses on the ability of local politicians to access patronage, pres-
sure voters, and buy votes. However, if clientelism were the correct explanation, we should not
observe any relationship between the vote for candidates with previous municipal assembly ex-
perience and distance to Havana, once we show that such distance is orthogonal to education,
which is indeed the case (see Figure 3.5). Alas, the closer to Havana, the greater the relative ac-
cess to clientelist resources; thus, if clientelism were at work, closeness to Havana should impart
an even greater grassroots National Assembly election premium, which we will show it does not.
A first step is to show (Figure 3.6) that there is a systematic increase in vote share received
with an increase in distance from the municipality to Plaza de la Revolucio´n, the headquarters
of the Communist Party in Havana. In this non-parametric representation that does not assume
any relationship between the data, the increased difference between municipal delegates and
non-municipal delegates in their National Assembly candidacies is clear up until approximately
350 kilometers from Havana: municipal delegates get more votes in such National Assembly
elections if they are far from Havana.
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Figure 3.5: Relationship between distance and education
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A more rigorous parametric analysis, with province and district magnitude fixed effects, con-
firms that municipal delegates have a significant National Assembly election advantage in areas
far from Havana. In Figure 3.7, this advantage is magnified by level of education. Focusing
only on areas located outside Havana by at least 334 kilometers (the median value of the dis-
tribution of the ‘distance variable), we plot the mean vote share for municipal delegates and
non-municipal delegates by level of education. Figure 3.7 shows that, for non-municipal dele-
gates (left panel), there is no significant difference in National Assembly mean vote share between
the highly educated and the non-highly educated areas. However, for municipal delegates (right
panel, Figure 3.7), the National Assembly mean vote share in non-highly educated areas is much
higher. The vote share premium for National Assembly candidates with local roots is especially
noteworthy in less-educated areas far from Havana. Figure 3.8 shows the same results but as seen
from the perspective of the elected candidate. Municipal delegates do particularly well in low
educated areas far from Havana, and much less well in highly educated areas far from Havana.
(These findings are confirmed by a more rigorous analysis reported in the appendix.) We reject
the clientelism hypothesis as inconsistent with these observations regarding distance.
The evidence displayed in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.9 combines the triple interaction of three
variables: education, distance to Havana, and being an elected municipal delegate prior to elec-
tion to the National Assembly. Figure 3.9 shows the coefficient for the municipal delegate based
on the results from Column 1 in Table 3.3. In Figure 3.9, different levels of education matter
more for a municipal delegate as distance to Havana increases, and this matters most in areas
with lower levels of education. The figure displays the steep positive correlation between dis-
tance and vote share in red (and solid), which can be easily compared with the much less steep
(although still significant) slope in areas with low education rates.
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Figure 3.6: Distance from Havana and voter share
●
●
0.
84
0.
86
0.
88
0.
90
0.
92
NON−Municipal Delegates
Vo
te
 sh
ar
e
n=75 n=38
Not Highly Educated Highly Educated
●
●
0.
84
0.
86
0.
88
0.
90
0.
92
Municipal Delegates
Vo
te
 sh
ar
e
n=48 n=23
Not Highly Educated Highly Educated
Figure 3.7: Education and vote share in cities that are far from Havana (more than 334 km)
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Table 3.3: Investigating the mechanisms: education and distance
Dependent Variable: Candidate’s Vote Share
(1) (2) (3)
Distance in Km Distance in Min
Delegado Municipal -0.0184* -0.0207** -0.0184*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
% HS Graduates -0.0119 -0.0535** -0.00590
(0.019) (0.027) (0.020)
Distance to Havana -0.0000219 0.000000745 0.0000377
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance x % HS Graduates -0.000305* 0.000235 -0.000498*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance x Delegado Mun. 0.0000918*** 0.0000922*** 0.000129***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% HS Graduates x Delegado Mun. 0.0896** 0.0909** 0.0908**
(0.037) (0.041) (0.038)
Distance x % HS Graduates x Delegado Mun. -0.000409*** -0.000406*** -0.000574***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Communist Party 0.00474 0.00681 0.00482
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Delegado Provincial 0.00567 0.00866* 0.00556
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Incumbent -0.00447 -0.00380 -0.00461
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Province Fixed Effects Yes No Yes
Observations 408 408 408
Standard errors in parentheses, errors clustered at the district level
District Magnitude Fixed Effects
Candidate controls in all columns: color, gender, education, international experience,
FAR, minister, awards
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Figure 3.8: Being a Delegado Municipal and vote share in cities that are far from Havana (more than 334
km)
Unpacking the CCP Influence
The role of the Communist party in Cuban society is very important; 191 of the 612 candidates
mention party membership in the biographies. Of these, 89 have been delegates to the partys
national congress, 23 serve or have served in the partys political bureau, and 56 serve on the
partys Central Committee; the rest held various roles at the provincial or municipal level.
For Table 3.4, we created a variable for high-ranking national level positions (party central
committee and political bureau) and another for local-level party posts (party municipal com-
mittee or bureau). We control for district fixed effects in all specifications. We aim to unpack the
influence of the party, that is, between highly visible and less-visible party leaders, and we also
want to ascertain whether this distinction has an impact on the vote share apart from being or
having been a municipal elected official. By controlling also for party’s roles, we verify that this
party-role variable does not cancel the significance of the delegado municipal variable.
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Several of our key findings survive this test (see Table 3.4) across all specifications. Prior
election in a multi-candidate contest at the local level remains statistically and substantively
significant, contributing to a higher vote share. Earning awards for good work also has a positive
impact on vote share, as does having had international experience. Demographic factors are not
significant, nor having been elected in noncompetitive provincial assembly elections.
Additional new findings are worth highlighting from Table 3.4. The local or the national
party variables are always positive; voters are not rejecting communist party candidates. In such
a low-information environment, the party members at the middle ranks are less well known to
the voters, which is why the local-level or the national-level candidates earn a higher vote share.
Whereas just one party-level variable is statistically significant in the first four columns, the inclu-
sion of both party variables along with other controls weakens the significance of such variables,
though they continue to matter. In column 6, with all the variables, local municipal assembly
election matters the most, followed by earning awards or serving as a local-level communist party
official.
Conclusion
On election day, Cuban voters remember that they live in an authoritarian political regime
yet nevertheless they understand that there are choices they can exercise. We have focused on
selective voting in a single-party election where the number of candidates equals the number of
seats but voters may vote for some but not all candidates on the ballot.
Consider instead the standard skepticism regarding elections in communist political regimes,
which the following quotation reveals: “A few questions are still hotly debated among students
of the [Cuban] political system, but certainly the nature of [Cuban] elections is not one of them.
Everyone agrees that they are more interesting as a psychological curiosity than as a political
reality.” This opened a 1968 article on Soviet elections published in The American Political Science
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Table 3.4: Unpacking the CCP
Dependent Variable: Candidates’ Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delegado Municipal 0.00841∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Delegado Provincial 0.00407 0.00579 0.00464 0.00532 0.00528 0.00637
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Local Level Party Official 0.0146∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0114∗ 0.0159∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
National Level Party Official 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0129∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Incumbent 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.00584 0.00421 0.00206 0.00477 0.00258
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Color -0.0000300 -0.0000576 -0.0000346
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender -0.00207 -0.00180 -0.00231
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Education -0.00237 -0.00224 -0.00266
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
International Experience 0.00881∗∗ 0.00727∗ 0.00821∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
FAR 0.0102∗ 0.00604 0.00736
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Awards 0.0116∗∗ 0.0100∗ 0.0114∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 610 610 610 610 610 610
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
62
Review (Gilison 1968, 814). In the brackets above, we simply substituted “Cuban” for “Soviet”
because the same dismissive lack of study has applied to Cuba’s national elections. In this article,
we demonstrate that Cuban elections already matter more.
We presented two striking puzzles: why would citizens vote selectively in a context where
their choice has no impact on the outcome and why would they select some candidates over
others? We presented evidence to address the second puzzle and thus focused on it. We show
that selective voters reward candidates for either their grassroots links or some merits. They act
based on the information available to voters about the candidates; in 2013, the voters were not
fearful or coerced nor were they responding to clientelistic relationships. We find that Cuban
voters value political experience and accomplishment in their politicians and, in this very low
political information context, they use information short-cuts to find candidates to support. In
particular:
• Voters are likely to reward those National Assembly candidates who had first proven them-
selves by winning a prior multi-candidate local election where some candidates win and
other candidates lose (hypothesis 4)
• Voters are likely to reward those who get things done, that is, they have earned awards or,
less markedly, performed international service (hypothesis 5).
• In areas with fewer well educated voters, or lower likelihood of exposure to national politi-
cians, the grassroots links matter, and these are developed through multi-candidate local
elections and constituency responsiveness.
Our negative findings are important as well. Above all, clientelistic favors are not the main
incentive when voting. This is related to the finding above. Voters prefer delegados municipales
especially in areas far from Havana, that is, far from where clientelistic resources would be. In
addition, demographic variables are never statistically significant in the analysis of vote shares
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for individual candidates. Serving as government minister is also statistically insignificant, as is
serving as a military officer in most specifications. Voters ignore prior entirely-noncompetitive
election to provincial assemblies in their assessments of candidates. There is no incumbent ad-
vantage in most specifications in standing for re-election, and mere affiliation with the communist
party has no statistically significant impact on vote shares the first two hypotheses are rejected.
These findings, in turn, shed some light on the first puzzle, namely, why would voters even
bother to vote selectively in this context. We suspect that a large minority of voters seek to
send a signal to the Communist Party leadership. This selective vote is more common in more
educated areas and closer to the Capital City where voters are informing the political elites
without punishing or rejecting the communist party. Furthermore, as our forthcoming work
will show, selective voting prevails in provinces other than from those where blank voting is
most frequent; blank voting, not selective voting, is a much clearer sign of political protest and
actual rejection of the ruling party (Superti, 2015). In turn, this permits two speculations, and
a call for further research, regarding Communist Party and government motivations to forego
the mobilization strategy of past National Assembly elections in order to permit a wider use of
the selective vote. First, the selective vote implies greater acquiescence to the political regime
than the protest-marked blank vote. And, second, the selective vote yields useful information
for national leaders to ascertain the relative popularity of cadres, especially that of the municipal
delegates running for National Assembly Deputy (for a similar motivation in China, permitting
some but not all forms of expression on the Internet, see King, Pan, and Roberts 2013).
From the perspective of the continuation of an authoritarian regime, some news is good.
Voters do not rush to support newcomers whom they do not know. Voters do not repudiate
Communist national leaders. Voters are likely to support local communist party officials or
national communist party officials at the expense of the more opaque middle party ranks. This
is why we had to unpack the implications of our third hypothesis. Voters accept the validity
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of officially-bestowed awards and officially-sponsored international service, which have been
important policies across the decades. And the 1992 electoral reform was productive to support
the political regime because voters value the capacity to send their favored local officials as
Deputies to the National Assembly.
For the proponents of change, some news is also good. Voters reward those who submit
their candidacy to voters where there is such competition, namely, at the local level. The reward
for the award-winners also implies support for merit, not just for power-holding. The lack of
substantial support for Government Ministers also augurs better for change. Further exposure
to information (more education, proximity to Havana) throws an election more open. The local-
competition and the awards variables do better than, or as well as, any of the party leadership
variables when all factors are considered.
Yet, there are unanswered questions. Does the 1992 electoral reform strengthen the political
regime because it worked as intended, or is it a political change that rulers will be unable to
control if nonconformist voting continues to grow? Is the lack of support for electoral newcomers,
evident in a low-information authoritarian regime, likely to be reversed and newcomers thus be
welcomed if there is a further political opening? Should the veterans on the Political Bureau give
way to politicians with local electoral experience? Will the reward for achievement extend to
those who succeed in Cubas emerging private sector?
To paraphrase the opening line of The Communist Manifesto, there is a specter haunting Cuba.
It is the specter of political change. Neither regime supporters nor regime detractors have a good
handle on the trajectory of change.
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4. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2003 ELECTORAL REFORM IN
COLOMBIA
Introduction
The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st witnessed what Mainwaring (2006)
calls a “crisis of representation” in Colombia, as well as in the Andean region in general. Citizens’
disaffection with democracy came in part from their belief that they were not being adequately
represented by those in power. This crisis was evident in public opinion polls that showed
citizens’ lack of trust and confidence in political parties, congress and politicians in general; as
well as in the rapid emergence of new parties and the increase in vote share for these parties
and for political outsiders (Mainwaring et al (2006)). The crisis was evident too to politicians,
for example, in a national address former president Pastrana said: “Our political system... is
marked by a crisis of representation wherein citizens do not recognize their elected officials as the
spokesmen of collective interests. Instead, these officials are generally identified as the purveyors
of local favors and nothing else.” (Shugart et al (2006)) It was perceived that clientelism and the
deterioration of the political parties were at the root of Colombia’s crisis.
One of the reasons for the prevalence of clientelism in Colombia that some of the literature
has focused on is the electoral system that was in place since 1929.1 The argument goes that in
Colombia politicians provide particularistic or pork-barrel rewards that voters can link directly
1 Law 31 of 1929 established the basic features of the system that was in place until 2003, with some modifications
introduced mostly during the National Front and then with the 1991 Constitution (Taylor 2009).
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to them because the electoral system incentivizes this by promoting intra-party competition (see
Crisp et al 2004, Carey and Shugart 1995, Cox and Shugart 1995). In a context with intra-
party competition, then, during congressional elections campaigning on the basis of the party’s
reputation would not be a good strategy for the candidates, since they were competing against
not just members of other parties but also members of their own parties. The main way to
win votes and distinguish themselves from the other candidates, including their fellow party
members, would be to offer clientelistic favors to the voters.
The main features of the electoral system that were said to promote intra-party competition
were: 1) each party could have multiple lists running in a district; 2) the votes obtained by lists
affiliated with the same party were not pooled to determine the total number of seats obtained
by the party in that district, each list competed separately; 3) there was no minimum threshold
for parties to be able to get seats; 4) the formula used to determine the number of seats for each
list was the quota and largest remainders (also known as the Hare quota or formula). In this
setup, candidates from the same party did not have incentives to cooperate with one another or
promote the party’s reputation instead of just their own. Also, the formula used rewards smaller
parties (in this case lists, Shugart et al (2006)), so this combined with the lack of a threshold made
it beneficial for parties to run as many lists as they could in each district. In the literature that
studies electoral systems and the incentives created by them, for example Carey and Shugart
(1995), Colombia’s electoral system pre-2003 ranks as the most personalistic possible within the
group of systems with proportional representation.
Through most of the 20th century Colombia had a two-party system. These two parties,
however, were each the aggregation of multiple factions (Pizarro Leongo´mez 2006) and during
congressional elections the factions would have their own lists, but still as part of the parties.
During the 1990s the two traditional parties became even more fragmented and at the same
time the number of parties increased. As a result, the number of lists registered in each district
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increased significantly. In many cases parties had more lists than there were seats available in
the district.
It was in the context of the “crisis of representation” and the changes in the party system that
in July of 2003 Congress approved Legislative Act 1, a constitutional reform that changed many
of the main features of the country’s electoral system. Colombian politicians had promoted
the idea that an electoral reform would contribute to improve their image, as Fabio Valencia
Cossio, president of the Senate during Pastrana’s government said “O cambiamos o nos cambian”
(“Either we change or they change us” Shugart et al (2006)). There had been multiple attempts
at reforming the electoral system during the late 1990s and early 2000s. It wasn’t until Congress
faced the threat of a broader political reform initiated by the president and that depended on a
referendum that Congress finally approved the electoral reform.
Thanks to the reform now parties are only allowed one list of candidates in each district for
multi-member elections and they can choose whether the list is open, so that voters can choose
a specific candidate from that party, or closed, so that the order of the candidates is determined
beforehand. Each list can have as many candidates as there are seats in the district.2 There is
now a low threshold for Senate and House elections and the Hare formula was replaced with the
d’Hondt formula (Acto Legislativo 1, 2003). This new formula is supposed to marginally favor
larger parties over small parties.
In Carey and Shugart’s ranking of electoral systems according to the incentives they create
for a personal vote, this new system ranks as less personalistic than the previous one. Now
members of the same party that run for elections in the same department depend on each other
to get elected, since seats are allocated to party lists, not individual candidate lists. This reform is
seen as a ‘step in the right direction’. Shugart el al (2006) evaluate the process for its approval and
the main components of the new system. They say ”the new system is thus a radical departure
2 For the 2014 congressional elections parties running lists in districts with only two seats were allowed to run up
to three candidates.
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from the old one” (p. 204) and conclude this overhaul of the system should contribute to make
parties stronger and politicians less personalistic.
What these authors failed to account for was the effect of the reform on the number of candi-
dates running and the effect of having a much larger field of candidates on politicians’ incentives.
Parties are now limited in the number of lists they can run, only one per district, but on a list
they can have as many candidates as there are seats to allocate. Since votes for a list are pooled,
the problem of spreading themselves too thin (having too many lists in the same district) is not
there anymore, so parties will try to have as many candidates as possible. Given that all parties
have the same incentive, after the reform the number of candidates running in each department
has increased by around 80 percent in the departments with more than three seats and by around
60 percent in the departments with three or fewer seats. Such an increase in the number of can-
didates has meant that in the cases of open lists (most lists have been open lists) candidates can
get elected with fewer personal votes (and a smaller vote share) than before.
So, even though the reform went in the direction suggested by the literature the unintended
effect of it has been that the number of candidates increased significantly and each of them needs
fewer votes than before to get elected. Since with open lists there is still intra-party competition,
I will argue that the reform failed to change the incentive structure faced by candidates and we
should not expect to see a decrease in the use of clientelism and an increase in party strength.
In what follows, I will describe the previous electoral system as well as the reform and how the
system works now. I will then discuss how the literature on electoral systems characterized the
previous electoral system and its predictions for the effects of the new system on Colombian
politics. After that, I will present some descriptive statistics and further show how with the new
electoral system politicians are not being led to behave in a less personalistic manner.
This paper does not explore whether even if we see candidates requiring fewer votes to get
elected some other aspect of the reform has led them to campaign in a less clientelistic manner
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and instead focus on championing policies that benefit the population of their department, or the
country, in general. The fact that candidates do not require more votes of their own than before
and that most lists are open is a strong indication of what the reform did not do for the electoral
system, at least in the short term. This is, however, a question that should be explored further.
I will present, however, some evidence in support of the argument that the reform did not
change how politicians behave. Before the reform politicians’ votes were fairly concentrated to
a few municipalities within their departments. This is consistent with the idea that their way of
doing politics was fairly personalistic and based on personal contact with the voters. If the new
electoral system had decreased the incentives for the cultivation of a personal vote we would
find politicians campaigning on their party’s reputation and platform, so these would be more
department wide policies, which we could expect would attract voters across the departments.
If these were the case, then, after the reform we would see that politicians’ votes would be less
concentrated in a few municipalities within their departments. Following Myerson (1993 and
1999) and Hirano (2006), I will explain how by increasing the number of candidates and thereby
decreasing the minimum share of votes a candidate needs to secure a seat, candidates should
then target narrow constituencies, which can be defined geographically (there are other possible
ways of defining them). Following also other studies on the Colombian Congress (Crisp and
Ingall, 2002) I will present some empirical evidence that shows that politicians have not changed
their behavior, and in the cases they have, they have targeted narrower constituencies. The final
section of the paper will conclude and discuss some of the future steps of the research agenda.
Electoral System and the 2003 Reform
In Colombia, representatives (161) are elected from 33 districts (departamentos), which range
in magnitude from two to 18 (average district magnitude is 4.88). In the case of the Senate there
is a nation-wide district that elects 100 senators, and two more are elected separately to represent
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the indigenous groups. Up until 2003, seats in both the Senate and the House were assigned
using the Hare proportional representation formula. There were as many lists linked to a party
as there were politicians wanting to run under that party’s label and the parties exerted very little
control over their own labels. The lists were closed and votes for different lists of the same party
were not pooled to decide how many seats a party should get. Also, there was no minimum
threshold for a party or list to be eligible to win a seat. With this system candidates from the
same party were pure competitors, they did not benefit from the votes obtained by members of
the same party.
With the Hare formula, also known as “Hare Quota and Largest Remainders” seats were
assigned to lists in the following way. The quota is the quotient of the division of the total
number of votes in a district over the number of seats to be assigned. In this system seats are
allocated first to lists according to integer multiples of the quota. The remaining seats (if there
are any) are allocated in order of the largest remainders, which are the result of subtracting from
each list’s votes the quota times the number of seats already obtained by the list (Alesina 2005,
9). If the list did not obtain a seat in the quota stage then its total votes will be the remainder.
In the case of Colombia, during the 1990s and early 2000s in each district there were so many
lists that very few lists reached the quota and most lists that got seats did it by largest remainders.
In 2002 no list for the House of Representatives elected more than one candidate and in 1998 just
two lists elected more than one representative. In practice, lists were ranked and the top M
(number of seats in the departamento) got a seat. This is how Japan’s old Single-Non-Transferable
Vote worked. Japan’s system had multi-member districts elected by plurality. Table 4.1 in the
Appendix shows the number of lists registered for the 33 districts in the two elections before the
reform and the two elections that have taken place after it. In 2002, on average, there were 27
lists per district.
In 2003 an electoral reform was implemented, its proponents claimed they wanted to promote
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Table 4.1: Number of Lists, Parties and Candidates by Period
Number of 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Candidates 1856 1131 1460
Lists 668 907 397 210
Parties with lists 66 73 37 14 17
Winning parties 20 38 17 11
more disciplined parties and contribute to fixing the fragmentation of the party system. The main
changes to the system were: in each district each party could only have one list, with as many
candidates as seats available; each party could decide, for each district, whether to have an open
or a closed list; a threshold was set to limit the entrance of very small parties (2% of the votes in
the Senate and 50% of the quota in the House3); and the d’Hondt electoral formula was adopted.
Voters now can vote for a list, if the list is closed, and if it is open they can choose a candidate
on the list or vote for the party. Votes for candidates in a list determine the final order of the
candidates on it and the total sum of votes for the list and its members determines the number
of seats that the party gets.
The d’Hondt formula allocates seats to parties in the following way. In each district there
are P parties and M seats to allocate. The votes for each party are divided by one, two, etc.,
up to M. These results are ranked from the highest to the lowest. The Mth result is known as
the distribution figure (cifra repartidora) and is used to assign the seats. Each party will get a
number of seats equal to the number of times the distribution figure fits into its total votes.
Table 4.2 shows an example with four parties and five seats. The numbers in bold are the top
five results and the number with an asterisk (66,667) is the distribution figure, the last column
lists the number of seats each party gets.
Now each politician is elected not only thanks to his or her own votes but also thanks to the
3 The threshold in the House of Representatives is 50% in the districts with more than two representatives and it is
30% in the districts with two representatives
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party’s and other party members votes, so at first glance the data shows that elected representa-
tives need less of their own votes than before to get a seat in Congress.
Table 4.2: Example of seat allocation with the d’Hondt formula
Votes Votes/1 Votes/2 Votes/3 Votes/4 Votes/5 Seats
Party 1 200,000 200,000 100,000 66,667* 50,000 40,000 3
Party 2 120,000 120,000 60,000 40,000 30,000 24,000 1
Party 3 75,000 75,000 37,500 25,000 18,750 15,000 1
Party 4 40,000 40,000 20,000 13,333 10,000 8,000 0
Institutional Literature on the Colombian Electoral System
There is a consensus in the literature that an electoral system such as the one Colombia had
before 2003 promotes personalistic politics. Its characteristics made it one of the most person-
alistic possible and scholars studied its effects on the strength of political parties and the use
of clientelism. I will present some of the main analyses and studies of the old system, and the
reasons why it was said to promote personalism. I will then discuss the literature that focused
on proposing reforms of the system or studied the actual 2003 reform and its implications.
Carey and Shugart (1995) rank electoral systems around the world based on the incentives
each creates for politicians to cultivate a personal vote. The ranking is based on four variables of
the electoral formula that influence the level of intra-party competition, these are: control over the
ballot or the party label, whether there is vote pooling, the types of votes and, district magnitude.
If the system has more incentives for politicians to promote the personal vote over the party
vote, then clientelism is more likely. This mainly happens when there is intra-party competition
during the elections. If there is intra-party competition it will be harder for politicians to just
campaign based on the party’s reputation and platform; it encourages “legislators to enhance
their reelection prospects by providing particularistic or pork-barrel rewards for which they could
personally or solely claim credit” (Crisp et al 2004, 826, see also Cox and McCubbins, 2001).
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The variable control over the party label refers to the degree of control parties have over their
own labels and endorsements and on the ranking of candidates on the ballot. If parties have little
control over their label, then, personal reputation is more valuable for politicians. The second
variable, vote pooling, focuses on whether a vote cast for an individual candidate contributes to
the party’s total votes and seat allocation or if it only contributes to the candidate’s vote total.
If votes for candidates from the same party are not pooled, then, personal reputation is very
valuable. The next variable is the type of vote voters cast, that is, whether they cast a single
vote for one party, votes for multiple candidates, or a single vote below the party label. A vote
below the party level will mean that personal reputation is more valuable than party reputation,
because member of the same party will be competing directly for votes. The combination of the
previous three variables determines whether the electoral formula is personalistic or not, and
the effect of district magnitude on personalism will depend on this; in systems with high levels
of personalism, higher district magnitude will increase it, and in systems with low personalism,
this will decrease as district magnitude increases.
From the description above it is possible to see why Colombia’s pre-2003 electoral system
was classified as one of the most personalistic possible. The main reason why this was the case
was that members of the same party would compete against each other in the same way they
competed against politicians from other parties, so they needed to distinguish themselves not
just from the other parties but also from their fellow party members. Voters did not vote for
a party but for a list among many of the party’s lists, and these were essentially personal lists,
only the top candidate on each list mattered and was visible to the voters. Parties had very little
control over their labels and endorsed many candidates. Added to that, seats were allocated to
the individual lists, not to the parties based on the votes of the sum of their lists. In this way
each list depended only on its own effort to win enough votes to get a seat, and candidates had
no incentive to cooperate with members of their same party that were on a different list.
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From the point of view of the parties, this absence of vote pooling meant that each party
could not reallocate votes from one list to another to increase the number of seats it obtained. As
Cox and Shugart (1995) explain, ”parties face a strategic problem of how to nominate candidates
and allocate votes to those candidates.” Without vote pooling parties risk wasting votes. This
happens, for example, when a candidate has received enough votes to obtain a seat but cannot
share the remaining votes with a candidate from the same party that does not have enough votes
to win a seat. Also, when there are multiple candidates or lists from the same party and none
have enough votes to win a seat independently and cannot pool their votes to help one of them
get elected for the party.
The formula used to allocate seats, the Hare quota (or simple quota and largest remainders)
favors smaller parties over bigger ones in the allocation of seats (Shugart et al 2007). This made
it beneficial for big parties to split into multiple lists, since, with the same total votes, they could
get more seats by separating than by having a single party list.
This phenomenon of parties splitting into multiple lists to win more seats has been named
operacio´n avispa, or “wasp” strategy. This is also known as the war for the residuals, where parties
by splitting into multiple lists would win seats not by quota but by residual and this means
each seat would “cost” fewer votes than it would have if obtained by quota (see for example
Pizarro, 2002, Shugart et al 2007, Bejarano and Pizarro, 2001)). Colombia’s Conservative and
Liberal parties employed this strategy, each list would represent an electoral “micro-enterprise”
that would work to elect the top of the list. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the traditional
parties, especially the Liberal Party, had many lists per department and in some cases had more
lists than there were seats to be allocated in the district (see Table 4.3 with the number of lists
by department that each of the traditional parties endorsed for the elections to the House of
Representatives, together with the district magnitude for each department).
Scholars of Colombian political parties and electoral systems in general have focused on the
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Table 4.3: Lists by Party, by Department - Before the 2003 Reform
Department Seats (M) Liberal Party Conservative Party1998 2002 1998 2002
Antioquia 17 25 16 5 2
Atla´ntico 7 6 19 1 1
Bogota´ 18 78 143 7 12
Bolı´var 6 6 6 1 2
Boyaca´ 6 8 5 5 6
Caldas 5 3 3 3 2
Caqueta´ 2 3 4 1
Cauca 4 7 6 2 1
Cesar 4 8 6 1 2
Co´rdoba 5 6 2 3 1
Cundinamarca 7 19 17 2 2
Choco´ 2 5 3 1 1
Huila 4 3 8 3 3
La Guajira 2 4 1 1
Magdalena 5 6 4 1
Meta 3 4 7 2 2
Narin˜o 5 3 5 2 2
Norte de Santander 5 4 3 2 2
Quindı´o 3 3 4
Risaralda 4 7 6 1 2
Santander 7 9 7 1 2
Sucre 3 3 6 1
Tolima 6 9 9 2 3
Valle del Cauca 13 15 17 7 5
Arauca 2 4 4 1
Casanare 2 5 1
Putumayo 2 3 3 1 1
San Andre´s 2 3 3
Amazonas 2 7 3 1
Guainı´a 2 4 3 1
Guaviare 2 3 2 1 1
Vaupe´s 2 4
Vichada 2 4 4
Total 161 277 334 58 57
76
effect of the institutional design of the electoral system on how parties work and have evolved
through time. Pizarro (2002) argues, for example, that in the context of weakening parties the pre-
2003 electoral system contributed to that “personalist atomization” of politics of the 1990s. There
is a strong interest in the literature in understanding how electoral institutions can influence the
behavior of politicians and the political party system and also lead to the preference of clientelism
over the provision of public goods. Shugart et al (2007) state that “the much-decried clientelism
and factionalism of Colombian political parties... is intimately tied to the incentives of SNTV...
the clientelism of Colombian politics and the apparent chaos of the process, much noted in the
literature, are in fact signs of strategic coordination within a personalistic electoral system.” (pp.
219)
Even though some of the literature shows how the traditional political parties were a col-
lection of factions or were fragmented since their foundation (see Gutie´rrez 2002, Taylor 2009,
among others), the fragmentation of the 1990s and early 2000s was seen as directly influenced
by the electoral system. In turn, an electoral reform was perceived as a way to contribute to
strengthen parties and make the use of clientelism less attractive. The consensus is that the Hare
quota, which makes it profitable for big parties to use the ‘operacio´n avispa’, and the permission
for parties to use multiple lists per district, were the main problems and the first issues to be
addressed (Roland and Zapata, 2005).
Shugart et al (2007) studied both the previous electoral system and the one approved in 2003.
The system precisely changes the electoral formula, from Hare quota and largest remainders to
d’Hondt, and forces parties to run single lists in each district. They highlight that “a benefit of
d’Hondt is that no party can ever obtain more seats by splitting into multiple lists than it could
by running a single list” (p. 6). To show this, they re-calculate the outcome of the 1990 elections
in the department of Huila (where M = 5). With the previous system, the Liberals obtained
three seats and the Conservatives two, but they only achieved this by dividing their candidates
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in multiple lists. If they had had single lists, the electoral formula would have favored smaller
parties and the Liberals would have received only two seats and a smaller new party would have
won one. With d’Hondt, the result would be the same as with the Hare quota, but it would be
achieved with unified lists, not divided lists. This counterfactual did not take into account the
possibility that parties would have more candidates in their party lists than they did when they
had multiple lists.
Even though the new electoral system allows the option of having open lists, where members
of the same party will compete for the top spots on the list, the reform was presented as a
definite improvement from the previous system. According to Shugart et al (2007), “the new
electoral system,... appears to be bringing about a rationalization of the party system, evident in
2006 in the dramatic and immediate reduction of the number of different party labels contesting
elections” (p. 257). On the intra-party dimension, the authors highlight that “the pooling of
votes on party lists means that,..., a vote for any candidate within a party-or solely for the party-
now contributes to the party’s overall seat total” (p. 257), and argue this should help parties to
coordinate their political activity and represent collective interests better than before.
Pacho´n and Shugart (2010) study the reform and the outcome of the first congressional elec-
tions after it was implemented. They focus on the effect of the adoption of party lists on intra-
party and inter-party competition. They find a differential effect of the adoption on party lists on
competition depending on the district magnitude. On one hand, in departments with low district
magnitude, intra-party competition decreases, while inter-party competition increases. On the
other hand, in departments with high district magnitude intra-party competition increases and
inter-party competition decreases.
In low magnitude departments, now that parties that have to run unified lists, different fac-
tions within a party find it better to separate from the party and create a new one, and in this
way avoid having their personal votes help rival candidates from the same party. This leads to
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bigger parties breaking up, which increases the total number of parties (and inter-party compe-
tition) and at the same time decreases intra-party competition, since each party will be smaller
than before. In this case competition between candidates takes place at the inter-party level,
however, the opposite happens in high magnitude districts. In these departments the incentive
is for smaller parties to aggregate and create larger party lists, since the electoral system now
awards seats based on the performance of the entire party. Since parties are now bigger in these
departments, there is more competition within the parties, especially in those that choose to have
open lists (most do). These effects are seen in both the 2006 and 2010 elections (the next section
shows evidence of this).
Even though parties are allowed to choose open lists, which promotes intra-party competition
and the personal vote, Pacho´n and Shugart argue that the fundamental distinction is between
personalized and listized systems. This change in the system fundamentally changes the electoral
strategy or calculus that both candidates and parties will make. They conclude that “when
collective vote totals matter, the incentive to cultivate a party vote dominates over the incentive
to cultivate a personal vote. (p. 648) This dominance of party based incentives will matter even
when parties choose to have open lists.
Increase in Number of Candidates: The Unintended Effect of the Reform
The studies cited above present the 2003 electoral reform as an improvement over the previous
system in terms of promoting party discipline and discouraging clientelism. The effect of forcing
parties to coalesce into single lists per department is seen as crucial in this task. What is missing
from the analysis, however, is an evaluation of what happens with the total number of candidates
running in each department and how that can affect politicians’ electoral strategies. Pacho´n and
Shugart show how in high magnitude districts intra-party competition is now greater, so parties
are bigger and have bigger lists than before. But, what should also be considered is that each
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party, in both low and high magnitude districts, will try to have the largest list possible and
include as many candidates as possible (the limit is the number of seats in the department).
Before the reform the lack of vote pooling meant that parties could risk endorsing too many
candidates and diluting the party vote into too many lists, which could mean winning fewer seats
than what was proportional to the party’s aggregate votes. With unified party lists, however, this
risk is not there anymore. Every candidate in an open list can contribute votes to the party
total, which is what determines the allocation of seats, so for the party there is no downside
to including in the list as many candidates as permitted. Parties also do not have to worry
about funding campaigns for more candidates if they run larger lists, in Colombia congressional
candidates bear most of the burden of financing their own campaigns. Since every party faces
the same incentive, this has led to an increase in the total number of candidates running in all
districts.
Why should an increase in the total number of candidates be relevant for the incentives
faced by politicians? A significant increase in the field of candidates will mean that, assuming
turnout does not change much and considering that most parties choose open lists, the total
number of individual votes a candidate will need to get elected will be lower than before. In
the case of Shugart et al’s 1990 Huila counterfactual, for example, each of the parties running
in the department could have included up to five candidates on their lists, instead of the two or
three each had. Assuming voter turnout was not affected, the number of votes obtained by each
candidate would have been much smaller, the approximately 180,000 votes cast would have been
divided between a larger number of options.
If candidates need fewer votes than before then there is no incentive for politicians to be less
clientelistic, especially in a context where clientelism is the usual strategy for winning votes. In
fact, a lower ‘personal’ vote share threshold to get elected could actually incentivize politicians
to target even narrower constituencies and win votes through clientelism.
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Following Myerson (1993) and Myerson (1999), Hirano (2006) studies the effect of the change
in electoral institutions in Japan over the type of constituencies that politicians target. Japan’s
electoral system was Single Non-Transferable Vote, which, as I mentioned before is the plurality
version of how Colombia’s electoral system worked in practice before 2003. In 1994 Japan im-
plemented a mixed-member majoritarian system, with a single member district component and
a proportional representation component. The reform was very different to Colombia’s, but the
model employed to analyze it is very pertinent to this case.
The model is based on the level of the vote share threshold that a candidate needs to secure
a seat in the elections. This threshold depends on the number of seats and/or candidates in
the district. I argue that the 2003 reform effectively lowered this threshold by incentivizing an
increase in the number of candidates that run in each district and a lower threshold means that
candidates are nowmore likely to target narrow constituencies over offering general public goods
to their districts.
The main elements of Myerson’s model are as follows. Assuming there are N seats in the
district and K candidates, and voters prefer candidates who can give them the largest allocation
of goods. Candidates can either offer a share of the budget (the more targeted good) or provide
a public good that benefits the district as a whole. The budget is big enough that each voter can
be promised $1, while the public good gives each voter B > 1. Q∗ = 1/K is the maximum vote
share that does not guarantee a seat in congress. This Q∗ will be the threshold4.
Myerson shows that there is a symmetric equilibrium in which all candidates provide the
public good when B > 1/Q∗ = K. In this case, no candidate can offer to enough voters an
allocation of the budget that is larger than B, which is what they would receive from competing
candidates. When, however, B < 1/Q∗ = K and all the other candidates offer the public good, a
4 Hirano defines Q∗ = 1/N, while Myerson uses Q∗ = 1/K. When competition is low and the number of can-
didates is uncertain, Q∗ = 1/K might be preferable. The description of Myerson’s results presented here follows
Hirano’s very closely.
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candidate can offer B+ ε to a fraction 1/(B+ ε) of the voters, where B+ ε < 1/Q∗. In this case,
the fraction of voters receiving the benefit is greater than the threshold, that is 1/(B+ ε) > Q∗,
so that the candidate is offering a benefit greater than the public good to a large enough number
of candidates to secure a seat. Since the candidate using the strategy cannot be defeated by those
offering the public good, it is better for all candidates to use the same strategy.
Myerson’s model shows that as the number of candidates increases and the threshold to get
a seat is lowered (assuming open party lists), politicians will target a smaller constituency within
their district, instead of offering general public goods. This result is, in a way, similar to Lizzeri
and Persico (2004), where the extension of the franchise leads to a move from campaigns based
on patronage and clientelism to the provision of public goods. In that example the extension
of the franchise, which increases the threshold above which a candidate can secure a seat in
absolute terms by enlarging the number of citizens that vote, makes campaigning on the base of
clientelism and vote buying not efficient anymore.
In the case of Colombia, the increase in the number of candidates is responsible for lowering
the threshold. Now seats are allocated to parties based on the aggregate amount of votes they
get, but within the parties the allocation of seats will depend on the candidates’ individual votes.
A factor I have not considered here is whether having more competitors will affect the way
candidates campaign and type of promises or offers they make. Could facing more competitors
make politicians change the way they campaign towards the provision of more public goods?
Considering that the initial context before the reform was that of campaigns based on clientelism
and now politicians need fewer votes than before, the fact that these might be more demanded
(by a larger number of candidates) will probably just make politicians offer more clientelistic
goods to each voter. This is, however, an open question that should be addressed further.
In sum, I have argued that the electoral reform, by promoting an increase in the total number
of candidates that run in a district, decreases the vote share required by candidates to get a seat
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and this in turn leads to an increase in the use of clientelism or targeted promises in electoral
campaigns. In the subsection that follows I will use the results of the last four elections for
which data is available, two before 2003 (1998 and 2002) and two after (2006 and 2010) to show
the effects of the reform on the number of parties, candidates and on the minimum vote share
required to win a seat5.
The main way to test whether the decrease in the threshold has affected the type of goods
or promises made by politicians would be to study the actual provision of public goods and the
use of clientelism, however, that will be part of a future study. In the meantime, I will show that
we observe that candidates’ votes after the reform are not less concentrated than before. This
follows the results from Myerson’s model and Hirano’s study of Japan, if candidates are better
off targeting narrow constituencies instead of providing general public goods, the distribution
of their votes will reflect that too. Myerson’s model does not define how constituencies are
targeted within a district. One possible way of defining constituencies is geography, candidates’
electoral support can be geographically concentrated. Hirano studies geographic concentration of
candidates’ votes in their hometowns. I will test how geographically concentrated are candidates’
votes within the departments in Colombia.
Number of Parties, Candidates and Vote Share
As Pacho´n and Shugart (2010) show for the 2006 elections, after the 2003 electoral reform
there is an increase in the number of political parties running for Congress in districts with low
magnitude (lower than 5), and a decrease in districts with high magnitude. This holds for the
2010 elections too. Figure 4.1 shows the difference in the number of parties after the reform,
by district magnitude. This figure shows how the number of parties is increasing in district
magnitude but the reform led to an increase in the number of parties in low magnitude districts
5 There were elections in 2014 but the data available is only preliminary
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(below five), and a decrease in high magnitude districts (above five). The difference is statistically
significant in districts with magnitude below four and above five.
Figure 4.2 shows how the total number of candidates running in a district increased after
the reform across the board. The increase is statistically significant for districts with magnitude
four and above. Before the reform the Liberal Party especially was known for running a very
large number of lists (c˜andidates). After the reform the Liberal Party can only run a number of
candidates equal or below the district magnitude in each department, so for this party the reform
meant that in some departments it had to run fewer candidates than before. The general results is,
however, that parties run more candidates than before. Figure 4.3 presents the data, the increase
is significant for departments with magnitude greater than three. In the departments with low
magnitude each party can only have two or three candidates, so the number of candidates they
run does not increase, but the number of parties does increase (Table 4.4 shows more detailed
descriptive statistics).
The data shows how after the reform the number of candidates running in each district went
up significantly. I will show know how that has affected the minimum vote share candidates
need to secure a seat. Figure 4.4 graphs the vote share received by the candidate elected with the
smallest vote share, before and after the reform (see also Table B.1 in the appendix). There we
can see how after the reform the minimum amount of votes required to win a seat in each district
decreased after the reform, this difference is statistically significant in districts with magnitude
equal or below seven. In districts with magnitude greater than seven there are too few data
points to make a precise comparison. When we look at the vote share received by the candidate
in each party in each department that was elected with the smallest vote share, this decrease in
the threshold is also evident (see Figure 4.5 and also Table B.2 in the appendix). Figure 4.6 shows
the vote share of all the candidates that won seats in each department. The decrease in the vote
share required to secure a seat is also evident here, especially in low (<= 7) magnitude districts.
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Table 4.4: Number of Parties, Candidates and Candidates By Party
Pre-Reform (1998-2002) Post-Reform (2006-2010)
Number of Parties
M Mean St.D Max Min N Mean St.D Max Min N
2 4.54 1.89 9 2 24 8.54 1.84 12 4 24
3 9.17 2.23 11 5 6 11.5 2.74 16 8 6
4 10.25 3.99 17 6 8 10.38 2.07 14 8 8
5 10.5 4.33 17 3 10 10.9 2.64 17 8 10
6 13.83 4.36 21 8 6 11.67 2.07 14 9 6
7 21.67 4.76 28 15 6 13.17 3.37 19 10 6
13 30.5 6.36 35 26 2 13 2.83 15 11 2
17 29 4.24 32 26 2 12.5 2.12 14 11 2
18 59 4.24 62 56 2 20 9.9 27 13 2
Total 12.14 11.34 62 2 66 10.7 3.39 27 4 66
Number of Candidates
M Mean St.D Max Min N Mean St.D Max Min N
2 6.96 1.75 12 4 24 9.7 4.63 17 2 24
3 13 3.52 18 7 6 26 10.46 43 13 6
4 16.63 4.74 26 12 8 28.25 8.77 42 16 8
5 14.7 4.19 21 8 10 39.7 10.54 56 20 10
6 22.67 4.84 31 17 6 48.33 13.42 62 29 6
7 35.67 10.94 49 23 6 69.5 18.45 92 51 6
13 56.5 7.77 62 51 2 131.5 50.2 167 96 2
17 64 4.24 67 61 2 146.5 20.5 161 132 2
18 229 80.61 286 172 2 227 52.32 264 190 2
Total 23.84848 40.56 286 4 66 41.34 48.04 264 2 66
Number of Candidates by Party
M Mean St.D Max Min N Mean St.D Max Min N
2 1.53 1.16 7 1 109 1.13 1.21 3 0 205
3 1.41 1.21 7 1 55 2.26 1.1 3 0 69
4 1.62 1.68 8 1 82 2.72 1.61 4 0 83
5 1.4 0.98 6 1 105 3.64 1.92 5 0 109
6 1.63 1.77 9 1 83 4.14 2.5 6 0 70
7 1.64 2.77 19 1 130 5.27 2.49 7 0 79
13 1.85 2.82 17 1 61 10.11 4.34 13 0 26
17 2.2 3.77 25 1 58 11.72 5.49 17 0 25
18 3.88 14.91 143 1 118 11.35 7.38 18 0 40
Total 1.96 6.09 143 1 801 3.86 4.12 18 0 706
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The figures shown here show the effects of the reform on the number of parties, number of
candidates within each party and number of candidates within a district, and the effect of this
on the minimum vote share (threshold) required for a candidate to secure a seat. This threshold
is smaller now, especially in districts with magnitude lower than seven.
Effect on Geographic Vote Concentration
I am going to present here some preliminary evidence of the effect of a lower threshold on
politicians’ targeting of constituencies. If candidates need to reach a lower threshold to secure a
seat then, the incentive is for them to target narrow constituencies with clientelism or targeted
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policies, instead of providing public goods for the district. One way of defining a constituency
is in terms of geography, candidates can choose to limit their campaigning to a subset of the
municipalities within the district. This, in turn, will mean that their electoral support will mostly
come from those municipalities they targeted. If, instead, politicians were providing public
goods, we would expect them to receive electoral support across the district.
Following Crisp and Ingall (2002)6, I will measure regional patterns of support using the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) and candidates’ municipal vote shares. Using the HHI for
candidates, before and after the electoral reform, I will evaluate whether we see lower, higher or
the same levels of vote concentration after the reform, and whether there is a difference depend-
ing on the district magnitude.
Table 4.5 shows descriptive statistics for the HHI before and after the reform for the different
district magnitudes (M = 18 is excluded since that is Bogota´ and the data is at the municipal
level and not more disaggregated). For most of the district magnitudes the HHI is bigger after
the reform, only in a couple cases is it smaller on average after the reform. To evaluate better the
effect of the reform on vote concentration I run the following regression:
HHIit = β0 + β1 Postt + β2 Postt×Seatsd + γ￿Xdt + ￿dt (4.1)
Where Post is a dummy for the elections after 2003, Seats represents the district magnitude,
and Xdt is a vector of control variables at the department level, I use area of the department and
population, since they can affect vote concentration. The variable Seats is replaced for dummies
for the different district magnitudes in some specifications. The main results are in Table 4.6,
and show, essentially, that vote concentration was not affected after the reform. These results, in
a way, coincide with what we see in the descriptive statistics, in the departments with mid-level
6 They studied the case of Colombia with a similar study that analyzed the patterns of support for Senators after
the implementation of the 1991 Constitution that changed the election of senators from department districts to a
nationwide district
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Table 4.5: Hirschman-Herfindahl Index Before and After the Reform
Pre-Reform (1998-2002) Post-Reform (2006-2010)
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI)
M Mean St.D Max Min N Mean St.D Max Min N
2 0.53 0.28 1 0.07 167 0.48 0.26 1 0.08 233
3 0.34 0.19 0.79 0.07 78 0.38 0.18 0.86 0.06 156
4 0.26 0.14 0.75 0.04 133 0.32 0.18 0.89 0.06 222
5 0.29 0.18 0.75 0.04 147 0.32 0.18 0.87 0.04 397
6 0.22 0.17 0.75 0.02 136 0.26 0.17 0.93 0.02 290
7 0.27 0.2 0.85 0.02 214 0.25 0.17 0.88 0.01 417
13 0.32 0.14 0.68 0.08 113 0.39 0.19 0.89 0.06 263
17 0.24 0.13 0.62 0.05 128 0.25 0.13 0.76 0.03 293
Total 0.32 0.22 1 0.02 1116 0.32 0.2 1 0.01 2271
district magnitudes, there is a slight increase in vote concentration after the reform (see columns
3 and 9 in the Table). These results might be showing that candidates had already concentrated
their votes very highly and the change in the electoral system did not significantly affect this, or,
candidates have constituencies that are not defined by geography but by a different characteristic.
A topic for future research would be to study this topic further and also study actual use of
clientelism by politicians.
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Table 4.6: Vote Concentration: Dependent Variable = HHI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post 2003 0.0150 -0.0111 -0.209 -0.292 0.00754 -0.0372
(0.011) (0.018) (0.123) (0.199) (0.054) (0.061)
Post × Seats 0.00110 0.000872 -0.00225 -0.00150 0.00105 0.000783
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Year = 2002 0.0191 0.0194 0.0190
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Year = 2006 0.0517 -0.107 0.0377
(0.012) (0.122) (0.053)
Year = 2010 -0.00655 -0.165 -0.0205
(0.012) (0.122) (0.054)
Post × M=3 0.0359 -0.00252 0.0376
(0.027) (0.036) (0.028)
Post × M=4 0.0740 0.0260 0.0759
(0.024) (0.038) (0.024)
Post × M=5 0.0480 -0.00537 0.0491
(0.024) (0.041) (0.024)
Post × M=6 0.0447 -0.0133 0.0453
(0.024) (0.043) (0.024)
Post × M=7 -0.00831 -0.0736 -0.00613
(0.022) (0.047) (0.022)
Post × M=13 0.0831 0.00103 0.0839
(0.025) (0.059) (0.025)
Post × M=17 0.0263 -0.0623 0.0244
(0.023) (0.062) (0.023)
Post ×Population it 0.0177 0.0125 0.0240
(0.010) (0.009) (0.017)
Post ×Area dept 0.000785 0.00145 0.00253
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 3387 3387 3387 3387 3387 3387 3387 3387 3387
Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors in all columns
Department fixed effects in all columns
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Conclusions
This paper has briefly studied the effect of the 2003 electoral reform in Colombia, focusing
on the implications of the new rules on the number of candidates that run and how that, in turn
can potentially change the incentives that politicians face when running for elections.
This is a very interesting reform and has multiple elements that are worthy of study and
should be tackled in future research. One question has to do with the choice of open lists
versus closed lists. Parties choose whether to have open or closed lists independently of other
parties and can choose differently for each department in which the register a list. How parties
make this choice and the characteristics of the politicians that are on these lists, would be an
interesting topic of study. This paper focused on the House of Representatives and left the
Senate aside. The reform changed elections for the Senate too and it would be useful to study
how the different reforms implemented since 1991, with the new constitution, have affected the
patterns of representation that we see in this body.
Finally, this essay focused mostly on describing the situation for politicians after the reform
was implemented. The question of how the reform changed incentives for candidates should be
addressed more formally and also study whether actual public outcomes have also changed due
to the reform.
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A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Baseline Estimates
Standard
Min Max Mean Deviation N
Relative Hits -18.711 77.690 -0.015 5.353 3696
Scandal Hits/Total Hits 0.000 96.401 2.741 6.841 3696
Newspaper Frequency 0.143 1.000 0.681 0.410 3696
In-State Scandal 0.000 1.000 0.022 0.146 3696
In-Region Scandal 0.000 1.000 0.117 0.322 3696
Log Newspapers 0.000 2.303 1.266 0.650 3696
Opposition Party 0.000 1.000 0.362 0.481 3696
Own Party 0.000 1.000 0.470 0.499 3696
Overall Bias -1.000 1.000 -0.108 0.906 3696
Panel B: With Voter Partisanship
Standard
Min Max Mean Deviation N
Relative Hits -18.711 77.690 0.108 5.479 3316
Scandal Hits/Total Hits 0.000 96.401 2.925 7.087 3316
Newspaper Frequency 0.143 1.000 0.709 0.403 3316
In-State Scandal 0.000 1.000 0.024 0.153 3316
In-Region Scandal 0.000 1.000 0.127 0.333 3316
Log Newspapers 0.000 2.303 1.329 0.623 3316
Opposition Party 0.000 1.000 0.370 0.483 3316
Own Party 0.000 1.000 0.490 0.500 3316
Overall Bias -1.000 1.000 -0.120 0.919 3316
Voter Partisanship 0.022 0.980 0.487 0.153 3316
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Table A.2: List of Political Scandals
Name Office State Party Scandal Time Window Source*
Rufus Brown Bullock Governor GA R Bribery 3/1870 to 5/1870 (1)
Roderick R. Butler Representative TN R Fraud & forgery 7/1870 to 1/1871 (1)
William Woods Holden Governor NC R Misuse of state militia 9/1870 to 3/1871 (1), (2)
David Christy Butler Governor NE R Corruption 1/1871 to 6/1871 (1), (2)
Thomas Osborn Senator FL R Bribery & fraud 4/1871 to 4/1871 (1)
William H. Bumsted Commiss Board of
Works
NJ R Conspiracy & fraud 9/1871 to 6/1872 (1)
Abraham Oakey Hall Mayor NY R Malfeasance 10/1871 to 11/1871 (1), (2)
William Magear Tweed State Senator NY D Embezzlement 10/1871 to 11/1873 (1), (2)
Alexander Caldwell Senator KS R Bribery 3/1872 to 3/1873 (1)
James Wood State Senator NY R Bribery 3/1872 to 9/1872 (1)
John F. Hartranft State Auditor PA R Corruption 8/1872 to 11/1872 (1)
Henry Wilson Senator MA R Bribery 9/1872 to 3/1873 (1)
Oakes Ames Representative MA R Bribery 9/1872 to 2/1873 (1), (2)
James Gillespie Blaine Speaker of the House ME R Bribery 9/1872 to 3/1873 (1)
James Brooks Representative NY D Bribery 9/1872 to 3/1873 (1), (2)
Henry Clay Warmouth Governor LA R Bribery 12/1872 to 1/1873 (2)
Lewis V. Bogy Senator MO D Bribery 1/1873 to 3/1873 (3)
Samuel Clark Pomeroy Senator KS R Bribery 1/1873 to 3/1875 (1)
William Seeger State Treasurer MN R Corruption 2/1873 to 5/1873 (2)
Edmund Jackson Davis Governor TX R Refusal to leave office 1/1874 to 1/1874 (2)
Josiah E. Hayes State Treasurer KS R High crimes & misde-
mean
1/1874 to 5/1874 (1)
William Adams Richard-
son
U.S. Treasury Secre-
tary
USA R Tax revenue fraud (San-
born Case)
3/1874 to 5/1874 (2)
Franklin J. Moses Jr Governor SC R Fraud & malfeasance 5/1874 to 10/1874 (1)
Tunis George Campbell State Senator GA R False convictions (while
Justice of the Peace)
1/1875 to 1/1877 (2)
John Godfrey Schumaker Representative NY D Bribery 1/1875 to 11/1875 (1)
Richard Chappel Parsons Representative OH R Bribery 1/1875 to 11/1875 (1)
William Smith King Representative MN R Bribery 1/1875 to 11/1875 (1)
*Sources:
(1): ProQuest’s archive of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post
(2): Political Graveyard
(3): Senate Historical Office
Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.
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Online Appendix Table A.2 – List of Political Scandals - Continued from previous page
Name Office State Party Scandal Time Window Source*
Alexander K. Davis Lieutenant Governor MS R Bribery 9/1875 to 3/1876 (1)
Joseph Rodman West Senator LA R Bribery 1/1876 to 12/1876 (1)
Frederick Adolphus
Sawyer
Asst Treasury Secre-
tary
USA R Forgery & fraud 1/1876 to 10/1877 (1)
William Pitt Kellogg Governor LA R Embezzlement 2/1876 to 3/1876 (1)
George Eliphaz Spencer Senator AL R Bribery 2/1876 to 5/1876 (1)
William Worth Belknap Secretary of War USA R Bribery 2/1876 to 8/1876 (1), (2)
William Robert Taylor Governor WI D Corruption 3/1876 to 7/1876 (1)
James Gillespie Blaine Speaker of the House ME R Bribery & fraud 4/1876 to 6/1876 (1)
Rufus Brown Bullock Governor GA R Larceny 5/1876 to 1/1878 (1)
Michael Crawford Kerr Speaker of the House IN D Bribery 5/1876 to 6/1876 (1)
La Fayette Grover Senator OR D Bribery & fraud 3/1877 to 6/1878 (3)
John James Patterson Senator SC R Bribery 9/1877 to 1/1878 (1)
Robert Smalls Representative SC R Bribery 10/1877 to 11/1877 (1)
John O’Connor State Representative OH D False identity 4/1878 to 5/1878 (1)
John Sherman Senate, Sec of Treasury USA R Fraud 5/1878 to 6/1878 (1)
Stanley Matthews Senator OH R Fraud 5/1878 to 10/1878 (1)
La Fayette Grover Governor OR D Corruption & fraud 11/1878 to 2/1879 (1)
Stephen F Chadwick Governor OR D Corruption & fraud 11/1878 to 2/1879 (1)
Noble Andrew Hull House & Lt. Governor FL D Fraud 1/1879 to 1/1881 (1)
John J. Ingalls Senator KS R Bribery & fraud 2/1879 to 2/1880 (3)
Charles B. Salter State Representative PA R Bribery 4/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
Emile J. Petroff State Representative PA R Bribery 4/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
George F. Smith State Representative PA D Bribery 4/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
William Henry Kemble State Treasurer PA R Bribery 4/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
William F. Rumberger State Representative PA R Bribery 4/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
William Pitt Kellogg Senator LA R Bribery 6/1879 to 5/1880 (1)
Washington L. Goldsmith State Genl
Comptroller
GA D Embezzlement 8/1879 to 9/1879 (1)
John W. Renfroe State Treasurer GA D Embezzlement 9/1879 to 10/1879 (1)
Isaac Smith Kalloch Mayor CA D Bribery 5/1880 to 6/1880 (1)
Charles Henry Voorhis Representative NJ R Fraud & embezzlement 10/1880 to 10/1881 (1), (2)
*Sources:
(1): ProQuest’s archive of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post
(2): Political Graveyard
(3): Senate Historical Office
Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.
99
Online Appendix Table A.2 – List of Political Scandals - Continued from previous page
Name Office State Party Scandal Time Window Source*
William Mahone Senator VA R Corruption & conspir-
acy
3/1881 to 5/1881 (1)
Stephen Wallace Dorsey Senator AR R Fraud 4/1881 to 6/1883 (1), (2)
Thomas J. Brady Asst Postmaster Gen-
eral
USA R Bribery 4/1881 to 7/1884 (1)
Henry M. Hoyt Governor PA R Corruption 5/1881 to 5/1881 (1)
Chauncey Depew Senate (candidate) NY R Bribery 6/1881 to 7/1881 (1)
Thomas J. Navin Mayor MI R Forgery 2/1882 to 3/1885 (1), (2)
Franklin J. Moses Jr Governor SC R Fraud 3/1882 to 6/1882 (1)
Daniel Wolsey Voorhees Senator IN D Corruption 5/1882 to 6/1882 (1)
Charles H. Houghton U.S. Collector of Cus-
toms
USA R Fraud & embezzlement 5/1882 to 11/1882 (1), (2)
William Pitt Kellogg Senator LA R Bribery 7/1882 to 7/1884 (1)
Roscoe Conkling Senator NY R Bribery 8/1882 to 9/1882 (1)
William A. Wright State Representative OH D Bribery 11/1882 to 12/1882 (1)
William Bloch State Representative OH D Bribery 11/1882 to 3/1883 (1)
Marshall Tate Polk State Treasurer TN D Embezzlement 1/1883 to 7/1883 (1), (2)
James Gillespie Blaine Senator ME R Bribery & fraud 5/1884 to 9/1884 (1)
Franklin J. Moses Jr Governor SC R Fraud 10/1884 to 11/1885 (1)
John Rhoderic McPherson Senator NJ D Conspiracy & bribery 6/1885 to 9/1885 (1)
William Joyce Sewell Senator NJ R Conspiracy 6/1885 to 9/1885 (1)
Henry J. Coggeshall State Senator NY R Bribery 6/1885 to 11/1885 (1)
Henry B. Payne Senator OH D Bribery 1/1886 to 7/1886 (1)
Isham Greene Harris Senator TN D Bribery 2/1886 to 9/1886 (1)
Augustus Hill Garland Attorney General USA D Bribery 2/1886 to 12/1886 (1)
John L. Brown State Auditor IA R Malfeasance 4/1886 to 7/1886 (1)
James Herrington Mayor IL D Malfeasance 4/1888 to 12/1888 (1)
Benjamin W. Roscoe City Treasurer NY D Bribery 3/1889 to 4/1890 (1)
William L. Hemingway State Treasurer MS D Embezzlement 2/1890 to 7/1890 (1)
Stevenson Archer State Treasurer MD D Embezzlement 3/1890 to 7/1890 (1)
Lee F. Wilson State Representative IN D Fraud 4/1890 to 6/1890 (1)
Eli J. Henkle Representative MD D Forgery 7/1890 to 12/1890 (1)
*Sources:
(1): ProQuest’s archive of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post
(2): Political Graveyard
(3): Senate Historical Office
Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.
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Online Appendix Table A.2 – List of Political Scandals - Continued from previous page
Name Office State Party Scandal Time Window Source*
Daniel F. Beatty Mayor NJ D Violation of postal laws 10/1890 to 12/1890 (1)
John McLennan Alderman NY R Bribery 10/1890 to 12/1890 (1)
Sol Van Praag State Representative IL D Fraud & perjury 11/1890 to 12/1890 (1)
M.J. Doyle State Representative MI D Bribery 6/1891 to 7/1891 (1)
Charles W. Buttz Lobbyst ND R Bribery 5/1894 to 5/1894 (1)
George H. Morrison County Treasurer NY R Embezzlement 9/1896 to 11/1896 (1)
Joseph S. Bartley City Treasurer NE R Embezzlement 2/1897 to 6/1897 (1)
Henry Heitfeld State Senator ID D Bribery & fraud 3/1897 to 4/1897 (1)
W. Godfrey Hunter Senate (Candidate) KY R Bribery 4/1897 to 9/1897 (1)
Lant K. Salsbury City Attorney MI D Bribery 2/1901 to 12/1903 (1)
Albert Alonzo Ames Mayor MN D Bribery 6/1902 to 9/1903 (1)
John A. Lee Lieutenant Governor MO D Bribery 4/1903 to 11/1903 (1)
Frank H. Farris State Senator MO D Bribery 4/1903 to 8/1905 (1)
Edmund H. Driggs Representative NY D Fraud 6/1903 to 1/1904 (1)
George E. Green State Senator NY R Fraud 9/1903 to 6/1906 (1)
Charles H. Dietrich Senator NE R Bribery 11/1903 to 4/1904 (1)
Joseph Ralph Burton Senator KS R Bribery 1/1904 to 6/1906 (1)
Barney A. Eaton State Senator WI R Bribery 1/1904 to 3/1906 (1)
John H. Mitchell Senator OR R Bribery & fraud 1/1905 to 7/1905 (1)
Binger Hermann Representative OR R Fraud 1/1905 to 12/1910 (1)
Frank D. Comerford State Representative IL D Bribery 2/1905 to 4/1905 (1)
John N. Williamson Representative OR R Conspiracy & fraud 2/1905 to 9/1905 (1)
Francis E. Warren Senator WY R Graft 2/1905 to 2/1905 (1)
William Leib U.S. Assistant Trea-
surer
USA R Civil service law viola-
tion
9/1905 to 11/1905 (1)
Frank J. Gethro State Representative MA D Bribery 5/1906 to 6/1906 (1)
George L. Lilley Representative CT R Corruption 12/1908 to 1/1909 (1)
Isaac Stephenson Senator WI R Bribery 2/1909 to 3/1912 (1)
Arthur C. Harper Mayor CA D Bribery 1/1909 to 3/1909 (1)
Jotham P. Allds State Senator NY R Bribery 1/1910 to 3/1910 (1)
Lee O’Neil Browne State Representative IL D Bribery 4/1910 to 9/1910 (1)
William Lorimer Senator IL R Bribery 4/1910 to 7/1912 (1)
*Sources:
(1): ProQuest’s archive of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post
(2): Political Graveyard
(3): Senate Historical Office
Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.
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Online Appendix Table A.2 – List of Political Scandals - Continued from previous page
Name Office State Party Scandal Time Window Source*
John Broderick State Senator IL D Bribery 5/1910 to 5/1911 (1)
Joseph S. Clark State Representative IL D Bribery & conspiracy 5/1910 to 3/1911 (1)
Stanton C. Pemberton State Senator IL R Bribery & conspiracy 5/1910 to 3/1911 (1)
Thomas Pryor Gore Senator OK D Bribery 6/1910 to 3/1911 (1)
*Sources:
(1): ProQuest’s archive of the Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle and Washington Post
(2): Political Graveyard
(3): Senate Historical Office
Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.
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Table A.3: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.372 0.243 0.287 0.215
(0.202) (0.215) (0.223) (0.225)
In-State Scandal 4.747 4.773 4.760 4.800
(1.429) (1.434) (1.435) (1.437)
In-Region Scandal 1.989 1.914 1.973 1.910
(0.670) (0.667) (0.674) (0.667)
Log Newspapers 0.472 0.366
(0.208) (0.209)
Opposition Party 0.859 0.863 2.462 2.396
(0.273) (0.272) (0.742) (0.759)
Opposition Party × Log Newspapers -1.200 -1.133
(0.400) (0.410)
Year -0.014 -0.019
(0.003) (0.004)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.232 -0.260
(0.432) (0.457)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.083 -0.985
(0.417) (0.406)
Share of Population that is White -0.027 -0.044
(0.619) (0.624)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -1.730 -0.700
(1.584) (1.619)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.146 0.133
(0.135) (0.128)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.837 0.831
(0.335) (0.334)
Log Population 0.277 0.278
(0.175) (0.167)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 1-4 of Table 3.
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Table A.4: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.405 0.298 0.391 0.301
(0.202) (0.210) (0.217) (0.217)
In-State Scandal 4.767 4.811 4.743 4.806
(1.423) (1.426) (1.439) (1.441)
In-Region Scandal 1.992 1.919 1.996 1.911
(0.669) (0.668) (0.674) (0.670)
Log Newspapers -0.310 -0.479
(0.196) (0.208)
Own Party -0.633 -0.689 -1.753 -2.085
(0.254) (0.260) (0.635) (0.676)
Own Party × Log Newspapers 0.864 1.061
(0.342) (0.369)
Year -0.014 -0.019
(0.002) (0.004)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.253 -0.350
(0.441) (0.470)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.196 -1.142
(0.443) (0.430)
Share of Population that is White -0.037 0.166
(0.628) (0.627)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -3.059 -4.264
(1.550) (1.663)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.202 0.210
(0.148) (0.146)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.694 0.732
(0.335) (0.339)
Log Population 0.226 0.223
(0.170) (0.161)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 5-8 of Table 3.
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Table A.5: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.387 0.273 0.345 0.260
(0.201) (0.212) (0.219) (0.221)
In-State Scandal 4.747 4.785 4.744 4.799
(1.426) (1.429) (1.438) (1.439)
In-Region Scandal 1.999 1.924 1.994 1.917
(0.671) (0.668) (0.676) (0.670)
Log Newspapers -0.005 -0.083
(0.153) (0.159)
Overall Bias 0.440 0.450 1.266 1.282
(0.151) (0.151) (0.399) (0.399)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers -0.627 -0.630
(0.214) (0.215)
Year -0.014 -0.020
(0.003) (0.004)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.240 -0.313
(0.436) (0.465)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.161 -1.074
(0.433) (0.419)
Share of Population that is White -0.031 0.079
(0.623) (0.622)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -2.471 -2.635
(1.562) (1.579)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.176 0.175
(0.141) (0.137)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.756 0.774
(0.334) (0.336)
Log Population 0.249 0.247
(0.172) (0.164)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 9-12 of Table 3.
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Table A.6: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.201 0.171 0.207 0.155
(0.216) (0.233) (0.233) (0.236)
In-State Scandal 4.789 4.853 4.830 4.888
(1.438) (1.444) (1.442) (1.446)
In-Region Scandal 1.865 1.793 1.862 1.785
(0.667) (0.656) (0.668) (0.656)
Log Newspapers 0.403 0.339
(0.242) (0.261)
Opposition Party 0.997 1.030 2.863 2.893
(0.328) (0.327) (0.879) (0.881)
Opposition Party × Log Newspapers -1.319 -1.311
(0.450) (0.454)
Voter Partisanship -1.094 -1.024 -1.406 -1.344
(0.866) (0.843) (0.875) (0.857)
Year -0.026 -0.030
(0.005) (0.006)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.228 -0.256
(0.546) (0.577)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -0.877 -0.719
(0.522) (0.521)
Share of Population that is White 0.376 0.349
(0.728) (0.749)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -4.734 -3.826
(2.264) (2.284)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.072 0.048
(0.197) (0.199)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 1.183 1.262
(0.383) (0.387)
Log Population 0.159 0.185
(0.197) (0.189)
Observations 3316 3316 3316 3316
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 1-4 of Table 4.
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Table A.7: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.129 0.184 0.178 0.196
(0.219) (0.231) (0.232) (0.231)
In-State Scandal 4.801 4.895 4.859 4.923
(1.429) (1.429) (1.440) (1.442)
In-Region Scandal 1.861 1.802 1.855 1.784
(0.668) (0.657) (0.669) (0.656)
Log Newspapers -0.882 -0.849
(0.276) (0.276)
Own Party -0.896 -0.889 -2.897 -2.865
(0.315) (0.316) (0.883) (0.875)
Own Party × Log Newspapers 1.403 1.401
(0.450) (0.450)
Voter Partisanship -1.019 -0.884 -1.402 -1.244
(0.869) (0.845) (0.902) (0.879)
Year -0.027 -0.030
(0.005) (0.006)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.397 -0.681
(0.563) (0.634)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -0.869 -0.503
(0.525) (0.513)
Share of Population that is White 0.269 0.421
(0.740) (0.744)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -4.313 -3.030
(2.276) (2.289)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.120 0.073
(0.208) (0.205)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.979 1.057
(0.387) (0.389)
Log Population 0.088 0.119
(0.194) (0.186)
Observations 3316 3316 3316 3316
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 5-8 of Table 4.
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Table A.8: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspaper Frequency 0.160 0.179 0.190 0.176
(0.217) (0.232) (0.232) (0.233)
In-State Scandal 4.787 4.869 4.842 4.903
(1.433) (1.436) (1.441) (1.443)
In-Region Scandal 1.867 1.803 1.861 1.789
(0.668) (0.657) (0.669) (0.657)
Log Newspapers -0.234 -0.243
(0.167) (0.191)
Overall Bias 0.559 0.560 1.558 1.549
(0.186) (0.183) (0.471) (0.468)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers -0.720 -0.715
(0.237) (0.237)
Voter Partisanship -1.262 -1.145 -1.571 -1.447
(0.902) (0.876) (0.923) (0.900)
Year -0.028 -0.031
(0.006) (0.006)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.313 -0.477
(0.554) (0.607)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -0.888 -0.615
(0.527) (0.519)
Share of Population that is White 0.309 0.373
(0.734) (0.745)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -4.410 -3.284
(2.265) (2.293)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.094 0.059
(0.202) (0.201)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 1.070 1.150
(0.383) (0.386)
Log Population 0.122 0.150
(0.196) (0.187)
Observations 3316 3316 3316 3316
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 9-12 of Table 4.
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Table A.9: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2)
Newspaper Frequency 0.293 0.227
(0.222) (0.223)
In-State Scandal 4.744 4.788
(1.436) (1.436)
In-Region Scandal 1.952 1.895
(0.671) (0.666)
Log Newspapers 0.376 0.296
(0.196) (0.202)
Opposition Party 2.266 2.191
(0.686) (0.699)
Opposition Party × Log Newspapers -1.002 -0.931
(0.357) (0.367)
Year -0.007 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
Opposition Party × Year -0.041 -0.041
(0.018) (0.018)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.205
(0.453)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.086
(0.430)
Share of Population that is White -0.160
(0.644)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -0.766
(1.616)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.148
(0.133)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.795
(0.326)
Log Population 0.260
(0.166)
Observations 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 1-2 of Table 5.
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Table A.10: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2)
Newspaper Frequency 0.386 0.297
(0.218) (0.218)
In-State Scandal 4.735 4.795
(1.441) (1.444)
In-Region Scandal 1.986 1.900
(0.672) (0.668)
Log Newspapers -0.248 -0.416
(0.183) (0.196)
Own Party -1.578 -1.913
(0.575) (0.620)
Own Party × Log Newspapers 0.707 0.905
(0.308) (0.338)
Year -0.033 -0.034
(0.011) (0.010)
Own Party × Year 0.030 0.030
(0.017) (0.017)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.340
(0.466)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.158
(0.437)
Share of Population that is White 0.246
(0.630)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -4.109
(1.647)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.199
(0.143)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.695
(0.330)
Log Population 0.236
(0.163)
Observations 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 3-4 of Table 5.
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Table A.11: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits
(1) (2)
Newspaper Frequency 0.345 0.263
(0.220) (0.220)
In-State Scandal 4.731 4.787
(1.440) (1.440)
In-Region Scandal 1.977 1.901
(0.672) (0.668)
Log Newspapers -0.013 -0.076
(0.154) (0.158)
Overall Bias 1.158 1.173
(0.365) (0.366)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers -0.531 -0.532
(0.192) (0.194)
Year -0.025 -0.024
(0.006) (0.005)
Overall Bias × Year -0.020 -0.020
(0.010) (0.010)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+ -0.281
(0.459)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+ -1.133
(0.435)
Share of Population that is White 0.076
(0.629)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21 -2.576
(1.579)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output 0.175
(0.138)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing 0.731
(0.326)
Log Population 0.247
(0.165)
Observations 3696 3696
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.
Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.
Even numbered columns include all additional controls.
Corresponds to columns 5-6 of Table 5.
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B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
Table B.1: Vote Shares and Votes of the Candidates Elected With the Fewest Votes
Pre-Reform (1998-2002) Post-Reform (2006-2010)
Vote Share of Last Elected in Department
M Mean St.D Max Min N Mean St.D Max Min N
2 23.84 5.18 31.93 13.87 24 17.22 3.91 26.89 10.91 20
3 18.12 2.51 22.56 14.73 6 10.4 2.79 15.55 7.71 6
4 10.72 1.88 12.97 7.14 8 7.27 2.91 13.45 4.46 8
5 10.59 1.74 13.39 8.27 10 6.82 1.7 9.57 4.3 10
6 8.24 1.5 10.71 6.35 6 4.46 0.81 5.64 3.61 6
7 6.08 1.04 7.01 4.26 6 3.42 1.26 5.33 1.49 6
13 3.11 0.15 3.22 3 2 2.05 0.12 2.14 1.96 2
17 2.41 0.2 2.56 2.27 2 1.12 0.13 1.22 1.03 2
18 1.18 0.2 1.32 1.03 2 0.99 0.17 1.12 0.86 2
Total 14.73 8.52 31.93 1.03 66 9.49 6.4 26.89 0.86 62
Votes of Last Elected in Department
M Mean St.D Max Min N Mean St.D Max Min N
2 8757 8937 35082 746 24 7042 7022 24453 786 20
3 30893 8201 44365 24053 6 19143 8200 32559 11101 6
4 22447 3889 28961 16669 8 15542 5533 25045 8772 8
5 32917 7536 48302 24590 10 23242 9285 44924 11814 10
6 27426 6776 38904 20464 6 15590 3170 20979 11969 6
7 31483 8041 38768 18428 6 17573 6809 27667 6547 6
13 26472 2884 28512 24433 2 17327 1571 18438 16216 2
17 22399 432 22705 22094 2 11842 2503 13613 10072 2
18 17413 1967 18805 16022 2 13732 3254 16033 11431 2
Total 21065 12387 48302 746 66 14471 8754 44924 786 62
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Table B.2: Vote Shares and Votes of the Candidates Elected With the Fewest Votes by Party
Pre-Reform (1998-2002) Post-Reform (2006-2010)
Vote Share of Last Elected of the Party in Each Department
M Mean St.D Max Min N Mean St.D Max Min N
2 26.88 6.8 44.87 13.87 40 18.72 5.03 33.65 10.91 33
3 20.71 4.53 29.89 14.73 15 12.81 3.22 18.85 7.71 14
4 12.59 2.71 18.34 7.14 21 9.86 3.41 16.11 4.46 22
5 13.11 3.76 25.75 8.27 37 8.17 1.94 12.46 4.3 34
6 9.76 2.6 17.53 6.35 20 5.78 1.47 9.47 3.61 22
7 7.56 1.94 12.13 4.26 29 4.88 1.41 6.92 1.49 23
13 4.19 1.89 10.46 3 14 2.53 0.51 3.56 1.96 12
17 3.11 1.23 6.75 2.27 12 1.99 0.88 4.17 1.03 12
18 2.96 2.16 7.6 1.03 27 1.38 0.31 2.06 0.86 11
Total 12.68 9.12 44.87 1.03 215 8.75 6.25 33.65 0.86 183
Votes of Last Elected of the Party in Each Department
M Mean St.D Max Min N Mean St.D Max Min N
2 9627 10572 49800 746 40 8878 8725 33131 786 33
3 35321 10483 53396 24053 15 23651 8756 39481 11101 14
4 26162 5117 34902 16669 21 21111 6820 33507 8772 22
5 40876 13081 82082 24590 37 27682 10031 48726 11814 34
6 32699 10851 63697 20464 20 20518 7256 38689 11969 22
7 39059 11302 66471 18428 29 24965 7946 37852 6547 23
13 34967 15141 85160 24433 14 21619 5966 33382 16216 12
17 29758 12618 67365 22094 12 20465 8694 40659 10072 12
18 44088 33376 117919 16022 27 18927 4710 29501 11431 11
Total 31630 19510 117919 746 215 20593 10089 48726 786 183
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